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I. Introduction 
For a long time there has been a debate on how human rights can be enforced 
through international trade instruments. While political attempts to insert a 
human rights clause into the WTO agreements have not been successful so 
far,1 such clauses have been included into free trade agreements and unilateral 
trade instruments, such as the system of generalised preferences.2 
The present paper focuses on the European Community’s Scheme of Gen-
eralised Tariff Preferences (GSP). It examines the recently adopted Regulation 
732/2008, which sets out the regulatory framework governing the GSP from 1 
January 2009 to 31 December 2011.3 The paper essentially asks whether this 
system of human rights conditionality is more than just a window dressing on 
the part of the Community. It argues that despite various changes made to the 
GSP regulation, a number of problems remain with the credibility of this ar-
rangement. Some of these also create problems in terms of the Community’s 
WTO-law obligations. 
The paper is structured as follows. After placing the human rights clause in 
the context of the Generalised System of Preferences, it analyses the WTO-law 
                                                 
1  Especially the US and France had pushed for the insertion of such a social clause 
which has up to now however been prevented by the resistance of the developing 
countries, see Lopez-Hurtado, C. J., The WTO Legal System and International Hu-
man Rights, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies (Geneva) 
2006, pp. 114-116. For an attempt to construct WTO law in a way so as to allow for 
trade sanctions in case of egregious human rights violations see Howse, R./Mutua, 
M., Protecting Human Rights in a Global Economy. Challenges for the World Trade 
Organization Rights & Democracy, International Centre for Human Rights and De-
mocratic Development) (Montreal) 2000, pp. 11-13. 
2  Examples are the Partnership Agreement between the African, Caribbean and Pa-
cific States and the European Community and its Member States or the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). For an excellent overview see Doum-
bia-Henry C./Gravel, E., Free trade agreements and labour rights: Recent develop-
ments, International Labour Review, Vol. 145 (2006), No. 3, pp. 186-206 and 
Bartels, L., Human Rights Conditionality in the EU’s International Agreements, 
OUP (Oxford) 2005, p. 241 et seq. For an overview about labour clauses in the 
United States regulations, see Compa, L./Vogt, J. S., Labor Rights in the General 
System of Preferences: A 20-Year Review, Comparative Labor Law and Policy 
Journal, 2001, pp. 199-238. 
3  Council Regulation (EC) No 732/2008 of 22 July 2008 applying a scheme of gener-
alised tariff preferences for the period from 1 January 2009 to 31 December 2011 
and amending Regulations (EC) No 552/97, (EC) No 1933/2006 and Commission 
Regulations (EC) No 1100/2006 and (EC) No 964/2007, OJ L 211, 6.8.2008, pp. 1-
39 (hereafter: Regulation 732/2008). 
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framework and relevant case law of the WTO-Appellate Body. Subsequently, 
the rules and procedures of the GSP human rights clause are described in de-
tail. Thereby some specific problems regarding its efficiency are analysed, and 
its compatibility with WTO-law is examined. The paper concludes by summa-
rizing the main points of criticism and suggesting ways to improve the GSP’s 
human rights conditionality. 
II. The legal and historical context of the GSP 
1. A brief introduction to the GSP 
The GSP of the Community is a legal instrument providing for unilateral tariff 
preferences for developing countries. It is governed by regulations adopted by 
the Council of Ministers.4 Although it forms part of the foreign trade policy 
and the development policy,5 it is currently based on Article 133 EC, namely 
on the common commercial policy.6 According to the Regulation, its aim is to 
contribute to “the eradication of poverty and the promotion of sustainable de-
velopment and good governance”.7 
As follows from the above statement, the GSP pursues various objectives. 
First of all, it aims to contribute to the development of developing countries’ 
economies by facilitating access to the European markets of goods produced in 
developing countries. To this end, it accords tariff preferences to countries 
which fulfil certain economic criteria in terms of poverty and non-
diversification of exports.8 It also includes a special arrangement granting ad-
ditional preferences to those countries which the United Nations has qualified 
as “least developed”. 9 
                                                 
4  See further Herkommer, V., Die Europäische Sozialklausel. Zollpräferenzen zur 
Förderung von Kernarbeitsnormen in Entwicklungsländern, Nomos (Baden-Baden) 
2004, p. 145. 
5  See in this regard Béguin, J./Menjucq, M., Droit du Commerce International, Li-
tec/Lexis Nexis (Paris 2005), p. 147. 
6  By contrast, a regulation that was based on Article 308 EC was declared null and void 
by the ECJ, see Judgment of 26 March 1987, case 45/86, Commission of the European 
Communities v Council of the European Communities, ECR 1987, p. 1493. 
7  2nd Recital of Regulation 732/2008. 
8  See Article 3 (1) of Regulation 732/2008. Also the countries may not benefit from 
more favorable trade arrangements such as preferential trade agreements, see Article 
3 (2) of Regulation 732/2008. 
9  See Article 11 of Regulation 732/2008. For an excellent overview on the develop-
ment of this arrangement under the Regulation of 2005 see Lopez-Jurado, C., El 
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The GSP’s second objective refers to the political and social reality of de-
veloping countries. For this purpose, the GSP contains a specific arrangement 
with a two-fold effect. First, countries that sign, ratify and implement certain 
international conventions on human rights and good governance are granted 
additional tariff preferences. Second, countries that commit serious and sys-
tematic violations of certain human rights conventions may lose their entire 
preferential status under the GSP, which would result in the withdrawal of all 
tariff preferences. 
When the Community introduced its GSP in 1971,10 only the first of the 
two objectives played a role. It was only in 1990 that more politically-oriented 
considerations were added to the GSP. The tool for this was a special incentive 
arrangement that provided additional preferences for countries which engaged 
in the fight against drug trafficking.11 In 1999, two other special incentive ar-
rangements were added, one referring to certain international labour stan-
dards,12 and the other one referring to the protection of rainforests. In 2005, 
these three arrangements were combined in the form of a “Human Rights and 
Good Governance Clause” (GSP+). 
Furthermore, in 1994 the Council introduced a withdrawal clause into the 
GSP as a reaction to the pressure from the European Parliament for the inclu-
sion of a social component to the GSP. This allowed for the withdrawal of 
preferences if a country violated the international conventions against slavery 
or forced labour.13 Later, the withdrawal clause was extended to a number of 
                                                                                                                                                     
nuevo Sistema de Preferencias Arancelarias Generalizadas Comunitario a la luz de 
los informes de la Organización Mundial del Comercio, Revista de Derecho Comu-
nitario Europeo 2005, pp. 447-484 at 454 et seq. 
10  Lopez-Hurtado, op. cit., p. 268. 
11  Article 1 of Council Regulation (EEC) No 3835/90 of 20 December 1990 amending 
Regulations (EEC) No 3831/90, (EEC) No 3832/90 and (EEC) No 3833/90, in respect 
of the system of generalized tariff preferences applied to certain products originating 
in Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru, OJ L 370, 31.12.1990, pp. 126-132. See fur-
ther Valette, M.-F., Le nouveau schéma européen de préférences tarifaires générali-
sées: Sous le signe du développement durable et de la bonne gouvernance, Revue du 
marché commun et de l’Union Européenne 2007, pp. 163-171 at 167. 
12  See Article 8 of Council Regulation (EC) No 2820/98 of 21 December 1998 apply-
ing a multiannual scheme of generalised tariff preferences for the period 1 July 1999 
to 31 December 2001, OJ L 357, 30.12.1998, pp. 1-112 (hereafter Regulation 
2820/98). See further Waer, P./Driessen, B., The new European Union Generalised 
System of Preferences. A Workable Compromise in the EU – but a Better Deal for 
Developing Countries?, Journal of World Trade 1995, pp. 97-124 at 104. 
13  The Conventions referred at that stage were the Geneva Conventions of 25 Septem-
ber 1926 and 7 September 1956 as well as ILO Conventions No. 29 and No. 105 
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additional human rights conventions. 
These different arrangements pursue a number of different objectives. 
While the basic goal of the GSP remains the promotion for developing coun-
tries’ trade opportunities, several other policy objectives have been added, 
namely fostering human rights and good governance. The provisions of the 
GSP regulation can therefore be seen as a combination between different and 
sometimes opposing interests which had to be balanced against each other. 
2. Implications of WTO law for the Human Rights and Good  
Governance Clause of the GSP 
a) The general framework 
One of the most controversial aspects of the GSP relates to its compatibility 
with WTO-law. The legal point of departure in this regard is Article I:1 of the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). This Article provides that 
all WTO-members have to be treated in the same manner in terms of market 
access (Most-Favoured-Nation clause).14 Following this provision, any GSP 
would be in outright breach of WTO-law, since a GSP necessarily puts some 
countries in a better position than others. 
However, around the sixties and seventies, WTO members considered that 
access of developing countries to markets of industrialised countries should be 
facilitated in order to take into account their structural disadvantage in the 
world trade system.15 Therefore, in 1971 Member States adopted a waiver,16 
which was replaced by an unlimited decision in 1979, known as the Enabling 
Clause.17 Both legal instruments provide that Article I:1 GATT does not apply 
                                                                                                                                                     
prohibiting forced labour, see Article 9 of Council Regulation (EC) No 3281/94 of 
19 December 1994 applying a four-year scheme of generalized tariff preferences 
(1995 to 1998) in respect of certain industrial products originating in developing 
countries. 
14  For a succinct overview see Carreau, D./Juillard, P., Droit international économique 
(2nd edition), Dalloz (Paris) 2005, pp. 175-181. 
15  See Michalopoulos, C., Developing Countries in the WTO, Palgrave (London 2001), 
pp. 2-5. 
16  WTO Waiver on the Generalized System of Preferences Decision of 25 June 1971, 
BISD 18S/24. 
17  Decision of 28 November 1979, (L/4903), Differential and More Favourable Treat-
ment, Reciprocity and Fuller Participation of Developing Countries. For an over-
view of the genesis of the WTO Enabling Clause see Santos, N.B./Farias, R./Cunha, 
R., Generalized System of Preferences in General Agreement on Tariffs and Tra-
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to generalised tariff preferences that are granted to developing countries. How-
ever, any GSP arrangement has to fulfil a number of conditions in order to be 
protected by the Enabling Clause. These conditions are contained in Article 2 
(a) footnote 3 of the Enabling Clause, which itself refers to the Waiver of 
1971.18 It provides that “only generalized, non-reciprocal and non discrimina-
tory preferences beneficial to the developing countries” are admissible.19 Each 
criterion raises a number of questions. This paper focuses on the criterion of 
non-discrimination, as this seems to be the most controversial criterion. Fur-
thermore, it is the only criterion that has so far been subject to interpretation by 
the Appellate Body.20 
b) The case European Community Tariff Preferences 
Until now the compatibility of systems of generalised trade preferences has 
only once been subject to review by a WTO dispute settlement body; namely, 
in the case “European Communities – Conditions for the Granting of Tariff 
Preferences to Developing Countries“.21 This case concerned a dispute be-
                                                                                                                                                     
de/World Trade Organization: History and Current Issues, Journal of World Trade 
2005, pp. 637-670 at 651. 
18  WTO Waiver on the Generalized System of Preferences Decision of 25 June 1971, 
BISD 18S/24. 
19  This is particularly true for the term “non-reciprocal” prohibiting the linking of trade 
preferences to certain return favours. Bartels assumes that the term „non-reciprocal“ 
only refers to the market-access and therefore does not prohibit the linking of trade 
preferences to certain political conditions, see Bartels, L., The WTO Enabling Clau-
se and Positive Conditionality in the European Community’s GSP Program, Journal 
of International Economics 2003, pp. 507-532 at 526-527. Other interpret this crite-
rion widely so as to comprise even conditions concerning environmental and labour 
standards, see Grossmann, G. M./Skyes, A. O., A preference for development: the 
law and economics of GSP, World Trade Journal 2005, pp. 41-67 at 56. 
20  Another problem that can not be addressed in this paper is the question as to whether 
a system of generalised preferences breaching the Enabling Clause and Article I:1 of 
the GATT could be justified by the general exceptions of Article XX (a) of the 
GATT allowing for exceptions “necessary to protect public morals”. It is however, 
worth mentioning that Article XX of the GATT itself requires that the measure con-
cerned does not constitute an “arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between 
countries where the same conditions prevail”. It seems therefore improbable that the 
Article XX of the GATT will apply in case of a breach of the non-discrimination re-
quirement of the Enabling Clause. 
21  World Trade Organization, Report of the Panel of 1 December 2003, European 
Community – Conditions for the Granting of Tariff Preferences to Developing 
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tween India and the Community, and dealt with the admissibility of a special 
incentive arrangement within the Community’s GSP promoting the fight 
against drug trafficking.22 
According to India, the drug arrangement contravened Article I:1 GATT 
and could not be justified under the Enabling Clause. India argued that the 
Community’s drug arrangement distinguished in an arbitrary way between dif-
ferent developing countries, and therefore violated the non-discrimination re-
quirement of the Enabling Clause.23 By contrast, the Community was of the 
view that the drug arrangement did not have any discriminatory effect,24 and 
that, in any event, it would be justified by Article XX (b) of the GATT allow-
ing for exceptions “necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or 
health”.25 The decision of the WTO Dispute Panel (“Panel”) was handed down 
on 1 December 2003. Put briefly, the Panel endorsed the position that had been 
put forward by India, and took the view that Article 2 (a) and Article 3 (c) of 
the Enabling Clause did not allow for a different treatment of developing coun-
tries.26 The Panel consequently found that the drug arrangement was not pro-
tected by the Enabling Clause”27 and could also not be justified under Article 
XX (b) of the GATT.28 The drug arrangement was thus considered to contra-
vene the Most-Favoured Nation Clause of Article I:1 GATT. 
This report was then submitted to the WTO Appellate Body, which partly 
reversed the findings of the Panel’s report. The Appellate Body took the view 
that distinctions between developing countries are, under certain conditions, 
admissible under the Enabling Clause.29 This position was based on Article 3 
                                                                                                                                                     
Countries, WT/DS246/R (in the following cited as “WTO Panel Report EC-Tariff 
Preferences”). 
22  See Article 10 of Council Regulation (EC) No 2501/2001 of 10 December 2001 ap-
plying a scheme of generalised tariff preferences for the period from 1 January 2002 
to 31 December 2004 – Statements on a Council Regulation applying a scheme of 
generalised tariff preferences for the period from 1 January 2002 to 31 December 
2004, OJ L 346, 31.12.2001, pp. 1-60 (hereafter Regulation 2501/2001). 
23  WTO Panel Report EC-Tariff Preferences, paras. 4.31 and 4.33. 
24  Ibid., paras. 4.63 ss, in particular, para. 4.75. 
25  Ibid., para. 4.91. 
26  The only exception applied to distinctions in favour of Least Developed Countries, 
as stipulated by Article 2 (d) of the WTO Enabling Clause, ibid., para. 7.102. 
27  Ibid., para. 7.177. 
28  Ibid., para. 7.236. 
29  World Trade Organization, Report of the Appellate Body of 7 April 2004, European 
Community – Conditions for the Granting of Tariff Preferences to Developing 
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(c) of the Enabling Clause, according to which the system of generalised trade 
preferences shall “respond positively to the development, financial and trade 
needs of developing countries”. The Appellate Body clarified that the term 
“needs of developing countries” did not only comprise development needs 
common to all developing countries, but also development needs which are 
only shared by some of those countries. As a consequence, different develop-
ment needs of certain countries may constitute a valid reason for differential 
treatment of developing countries.30 
However, the Appellate Body made it clear that certain conditions have to 
be met.31 First, the needs of the developing countries have to be determined 
“according to an objective standard” which may be recognized in the WTO 
agreement or in “multilateral instruments adopted by international organiza-
tions”.32 Next, the measure in question must be a positive response to the de-
veloping countries’ need. In this context, the Appellate Body required a “suffi-
cient nexus” between the preferential treatment and “the likelihood of alleviat-
ing the relevant ‘development, financial [or] trade need’”.33 In other words, the 
preferential treatment must be appropriate to meet the development need con-
cerned. The tariff preferences must also be “made available to all beneficiaries 
that share that need”. Finally, the positive response must not inflict “unjustifi-
                                                                                                                                                     
Countries, WT/DS246/AB/R, AB-2004-1 (in the following cited as “WTO Appellate 
Body Report EC-Tariff Preferences”), para. 165. 
30  WTO Appellate Body Report EC-Tariff Preferences, para. 162. For a critical review 
of this finding see McKenzie, M., Case Note: European Communities – Conditions 
for the Granting of Tariff Preferences to Developing Countries, Melbourne Journal 
of International Law 2005, Vol. 6, No. 1, available under:   
<http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbJIL/2005/>. 
31  WTO Appellate Body Report EC – Tariff Preferences, para. 163. With regard to this 
point different opinions have been expressed. According to Howse any differentiati-
on between developing countries was admissible, Howse, R., India’s WTO Challen-
ge to Drug Enforcement Conditions in the European Community Generalized Sys-
tem of Preferences: A Little Known Case with Major Repercussions for “Political” 
Conditionality in US Trade Policy, Chicago Journal of International Law 2003, pp. 
385-405 at 387 et seq. Others submitted that the Enabling clause did not allow for 
any differentiation between developing countries, see Haan, E., Integrating deve-
lopment concerns into trade relations: The European Union’s revised General Sys-
tem of Preferences, in: Denter, E. et al. (eds.): International economic with a human 
face, Kluwer International Law (Den Haag/Cambridge, Massachusets) 1998, pp. 
307-325 at 319. 
32  WTO Appellate Body Report EC – Tariff Preferences, para. 163. 
33  Ibid., para. 164. 
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able burdens on other Members”.34 
In the case at hand, the Appellate Body came, just as the Panel, to the con-
clusion that the Community’s GSP arrangement did not meet these require-
ments. The Appellate Body did not deal with each requirement in detail. 
Rather, it simply noted that the GSP Regulation did not set out the conditions 
for admission of countries to the drug arrangement, and did not provide for a 
possibility to add other countries fulfilling the relevant requirements.35 The 
drug arrangement could not therefore be justified by the Enabling Clause, and 
thus contravened Article I:1 of the GATT.36 As will be seen later, the above 
criteria established by the Appellate Body are of crucial importance in the as-
sessment of the GSP’s “Human Rights and Good Governance Clause”. 
III. Human Rights conditionality in the special incentive  
arrangement (GSP+) 
1. How does GSP+ function? 
a) The conditions for the eligibility for GSP+ 
i) Technical criteria 
In order to benefit from the “special incentive arrangement for sustainable de-
velopment and good governance”, several technical requirements must be ful-
filled. The scope of application of the GSP+ covers, in principle, all countries 
listed in Annex I of the Regulation.37 The special preferences apply to all 
goods which are listed in Annex II of the Regulation.38 However, certain eco-
nomic sectors of the beneficiary country may be excluded from the scope of 
GSP+ if they are considered to be particularly competitive.39 
Since 2006 countries must fall under the category of “vulnerable countries” 
                                                 
34  Ibid., para. 165. 
35  Ibid., paras. 182 and 187. 
36  See ibid., para. 190 lit. d. 
37  Articles 2 and 8 of Regulation 732/2008. However, as the least developed countries 
already benefit from a special arrangement under Article 11 of Regulation 732/2008 
those countries will have no incentive to apply the arrangement under GSP+. Some 
authors consider that Least Developing Countries are a priori excluded from the 
scope of GSP, see Herkommer, op cit., p. 175. 
38  Article 4 of Regulation 732/2008. 
39  Article 7 (3) and column C of Annex I of Regulation 732/2008. 
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in order to be eligible for the GSP+ arrangement.40 The purpose of this prereq-
uisite is to limit the GSP+ to those countries that have special difficulties com-
plying with the international conventions due to their economic situation.41 
Three conditions have to be fulfilled in this regard, of which the first two are 
mere repetitions of the criteria for eligibility to the general GSP arrangement. 
First, a country must not have been classified by the World Bank as a high in-
come country during the last three years. Second, the five largest sections of 
the country’s GSP-covered imports must represent “more than 75 % in value 
of its total GSP-covered imports”.42 
A new requirement is introduced by the third condition, stipulating that the 
country’s GSP-covered imports must “represent less than 1 % in value of total 
GSP-covered imports to the Community”.43 This results, however, in the ex-
clusion of stronger exporting countries like China, Brazil and Pakistan. From a 
human rights perspective this limitation, in the GSP+’s scope, seems unfortu-
nate. The mere fact that a country has decent economic performance does not 
imply that it has no problems with regards to human rights, as is evident from 
the examples of Pakistan and China.44 
ii) Relevant international conventions 
The core of the “Human Rights and Good Governance Clause” consists of 27 
international conventions that potential beneficiary countries have to imple-
                                                 
40  See Article 8 (2) of Regulation 732/2008 and Article 9 (3) of Council Regulation (EC) 
No 980/2005 of 27 June 2005 applying a scheme of generalised tariff preferences, OJ L 
169, 30.6.2005, pp. 1-43 (hereafter: Regulation 980/2005). The former GSP+ arrange-
ments did not contain such a condition; see for example Article 14 of Regulation 
2501/2001. For an assessment of the new conditions see Valette, op cit., p. 169. 
41  See 7th Recital of Regulation 980/2005. Other countries are presumed not to need 
special support for the observance of the relevant international standards, Proposal 
for a Council Regulation applying a scheme of generalised tariff preferences, 
COM(2004) 699 final of 20 October 2004, p. 4. 
42  Article 8 (2) (a) of Regulation 732/2008. The aim of this criterion is to ensure that only 
countries depending on a few export goods benefit from the additional preferences as 
these countries are highly susceptible to price fluctuations at the world market. 
43  Article 8 (2) (b) of Regulation 732/2008. 
44  See for example the human rights reports of Amnesty International available at 
<http://web.amnesty.org/library/eng-chn/index>, last checked on 5 March 2009. 
Schöppenthau also draws attention to the fact that the scope of GSP+ is very limited, 
anyhow, as also the least developed countries are exempted from its scope, Schöp-
penthau, P. v., Social Clause: Effective Tool or Fig Leaf?, European Retail Digest 
1998, pp. 44-45 at 44. 
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ment.45 The GSP Regulation distinguishes “Core human and labour rights 
UN/ILO Conventions” (Part A) from “Conventions related to the environment 
and governance principles” (Part B).46 Part A comprises the eight ILO Con-
ventions on core labour standards, namely on freedom of association and col-
lective bargaining47, on the abolition of forced labour48, on child labour49 and 
on non-discrimination50. Since 2005, it also includes certain “core” UN-human 
rights conventions, including the two UN Covenants, the Conventions against 
racial and gender discrimination, the Convention against torture, the Conven-
tion on the Rights of the Child and the conventions against Apartheid and 
Genocide, respectively.51 Part B of Annex III makes reference to certain key 
                                                 
45  Article 8 (1) (a) of Regulation 732/2008 referring to Annex III of this regulation. 
46  The designation of art A of the Annex is in two ways misleading: First of all, the 
distinction between human rights and labour rights as suggested by title is, to say the 
least, disputable, as core labour rights also have human rights character and some 
human rights clearly have a social or labour dimension, see Sepúlveda, M. et al.: 
Human Rights Reference Handbook (3rd edition), University for Peace (Costa Rica) 
2004, p. 260 et seq. Secondly, Annex III does not comprise all of the treaties re-
ferred to as “Core International Human Rights Treaties” by the UN High Com-
misioner for Human Rights, i.e. the International Convention for the Protection of 
All Persons from Enforced Disappearance, the International Convention on the Pro-
tection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families and the 
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, see Bartels, L., The WTO-
Legality of the EU’s GSP Agreement, Journal of International Economic Law 2007, 
869-886 at 878. 
47  Convention concerning Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Or-
ganise (No 87), Convention concerning the Application of the Principles of the 
Right to Organise and to Bargain Collectively (No 98). 
48  Convention concerning Forced or Compulsory Labour (No 29), Convention con-
cerning the Abolition of Forced Labour (No 105). 
49  Convention concerning Minimum Age for Admission to Employment (No 138), 
Convention concerning the Prohibition and Immediate Action for the Elimination of 
the Worst Forms of Child Labour (No 182). 
50  Convention concerning Equal Remuneration of Men and Women Workers for Work 
of Equal Value (No 100) and Convention concerning Discrimination in Respect of 
Employment and Occupation (No 111). 
51  More specifically, Part A of Annex III of Regulation 732/2008 the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights, the International Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Racial Discrimination, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women, the Convention Against Torture and other Cruel, 
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, the Convention on the Rights of 
the Child, the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Geno-
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conventions on climate protection52, the protection of the biosphere53, the 
treatment of dangerous waste and pollutants54, the fight against drug produc-
tion and trafficking55 and the fight against corruption56. The comprehensive 
nature of this system seems remarkable considering that the GSP+ started from 
a very narrow social clause in 1998, which referred only to six labour stan-
dards, excluding those banning forced labour.57 
Some questions remain regarding the choice of the conventions covered in 
the Human Rights and Good Governance Clause. In the view of the European 
Commission, the human and labour rights conventions “incorporate universal 
standards and reflect rules of customary international law and they form the 
core basis of the concept of sustainable development”.58 Yet, as Bartels points 
out, not all EU Member States have ratified the Genocide Convention. Simi-
larly, the Apartheid Convention has not even been ratified by half of the Mem-
ber States.59 A similar point can be made with respect to some of the conven-
tions on good governance and environmental protection that are said to reflect 
                                                                                                                                                     
cide and the International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the 
Crime of Apartheid. 
52  Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, Kyoto Protocol to 
the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. 
53  Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, 
Convention on Biological Diversity and the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety. 
54  Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous 
Wastes and Their Disposal, Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants. 
55  United Nations Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs (1961), United Nations Con-
vention on Psychotropic Substances (1971), United Nations Convention against Il-
licit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (1988). 
56  United Nations Convention against Corruption (Mexico). 
57  See Article 11 (2) of Regulation 2820/98 which only contained ILO Convention No 
87 on Freedom of Association and the Right to Organise, ILO Convention No 98 on 
the Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining and Convention No 138 concerning 
Minimum Age for Admission to Employment. This was perceived as an arbitrary 
distinction between important and less important core labour standards. In particu-
lar, Regulation 2820/98 was criticized for having ignored the Declaration of Funda-
mental Rights at Work 1998 which had been adopted six months before the adoption 
of Regulation 2820/98, see Campenhausen, A., Sozialklauseln im internationalen 
Handel. Eine entwicklungsvölkerrechtliche Untersuchung insbesondere über Sozial-
klauseln im internationalen Handelsverkehr und ihre praktische Bedeutung, TENEA 
Verlag (Bristol/Berlin) 2004, p. 143. 
58  COM(2004) 699, op cit., p. 4. 
59  Bartels, WTO Legality 2007, op cit., p. 878. 
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“basic global norms” for sustainable development.60 Valette states, for exam-
ple, that the UN Convention against Corruption had not entered into force 
when Regulation 980/2005 was adopted, nor was it ratified by all the Member 
States of the Community.61 Such divergences cast doubts as to the universality 
of the aforementioned conventions. 
Another aspect that raises a number of questions about the selection process 
is the fact that some of the Conventions are not completely applied by the 
Member States of the Community themselves.62 Germany, for instance, has 
been breaching ILO Convention No. 87 on Freedom of Association by failing 
to grant civil servants the right to strike.63 Similarly, the United Kingdom has 
been violating the same convention by prohibiting trade unions to exclude 
members of extremist parties, infringing their right to draw up their own con-
stitutions and rules.64 While it is true that even European trade unions and ILO 
officials do not view infringements committed by the EC Member States as 
comparable to those of many developing countries,65 it seems that EU Member 
                                                 
60  COM(2004) 699, op cit., p. 4. 
61  Valette, op cit., p. 170. While Regulation 980/2005 was adopted on 27 May 2005, 
the Convention against Corruption only entered into force on 14 December 2005. 
For more information see   
<http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/ CAC/signatories.html>. 
62  See further Novitz, T., The European Union an International Labour Standards: The 
Dynamics of Dialogue between the EU and the ILO, in: Alston, P. (ed.): Labour 
Rights as Human Rights, OUP (Oxford) 2005, pp. 214-239 at 219.The position of 
the Commission that the „fundamental principles and rights at work identified by the 
International Labour Organization of course apply in their entirety to the countries 
of the EU“, therefore seems somewhat problematic, see Communication from the 
Commission to the Council, the European Parliament and the Economic and Social 
Committee, Promoting core Labour Standards and Improving Social governance in 
the context of globalisation, COM(2001) 416 final of 18 July 2001, p. 11. 
63  Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations ( 
hereafter CEACR), Individual Observation Concerning Convention Nr. 87 (Ger-
many) 1991, CEACR Individual Observation Concerning Convention Nr. 87 (Ger-
many) 2003. CEACR Individual Observation Concerning Convention Nr. 87 (Ger-
many) 2005 and 2006. 
64  CEACR Individual Observation Concerning Convention Nr. 87 (United Kingdom) 
2007. 
65  This has been stated by Michel Hansenne, the former director general of the ILO. 
See the statement of the former director general of the ILO, and Patrick Itschert, the 
former director general of the ETUC-branch Textiles, Clothing and Leather; see 
Hansenne, M., Le bureau International du travail et la clause sociale, in: Horman, D. 
(ed.): Mondialisation et Droits Sociaux. La clause sociale en débat, GRESEA 
(Brussels) 1997, pp. 13-24 at 22 and Itschert, P., Clause Sociale et Solidarités Nord-
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States do not attribute as much importance to international standards as they 
would expect from developing countries. This leads to a double standard 
which damages the credibility of the “Human Rights and Good Governance” 
clause. 
iii) Requirements of implementation 
Apart from defining the international conventions, the GSP Regulation sets out 
certain requirements regarding the implementation of these conventions. The 
GSP+ applies only to those countries which have “ratified and effectively im-
plemented” the relevant conventions.66 The term “effective” and the reference 
to “implementing legislation and measures” suggests that the GSP+ does not 
merely refer to an incorporation of the international provisions in national law, 
but it also requires the provisions to be applied and enforced into national prac-
tice.67 This standard seems to be higher than the standard of the GSP regula-
tion from 2001, which only stipulated that “the substance of the standards” of 
reference must be incorporated.68 The question of when a country may be re-
garded as acting in compliance with the relevant treaties has to be answered 
separately for each treaty, taking into account the findings of the relevant su-
pervisory bodies. Finally, the country has to commit itself “to maintain the 
ratification of the conventions”, advocate for their proper implementation and 
accept regular supervisory mechanisms.69 
The innovative aspect of Regulation 732/2008 is that it does away with the 
                                                                                                                                                     
Sud, in: Horman D.: Mondialisation et Droits Sociaux. La clause sociale en débat, 
GRESEA (Brussels) 1997, pp. 60-70 at 66. 
66  Article 8 (1) (a) of Regulation 732/2008. By contrast, the former GSP regulation did 
not require ratification of the conventions concerned, see Article 14 (2) of Regula-
tion 2501/2001. 
67  Article 8 (1) (b) of Regulation 732/2008. Before the adoption of Regulation 
980/2005 it had been speculated that the GSP+ would only contain a ratification re-
quirement in order to render GSP+ more attractive for potential beneficiary count-
ries, Dispersyn, M., Un nouveau cadre pour la dimension sociale dans le Système de 
Préférences Généralisées (SPG) de la Communauté, in: Daugareilh, I.: Mondialisa-
tion, travail et droits fondamentaux, Bruylant/ LGDL (Brussels/Paris) 2005, pp. 
153-179 at 177. This presumption was already rebutted by the 1st proposal of the 
Commission, see COM (2004) 699, op. cit., p. 12. 
68  Article 14 (2) of Regulation 2501/2001. See further, Ölz, M., Die Kernarbeitsnor-
men der Internationalen Arbeitsorganisation im Licht der neuen handelspolitischen 
»Sozialklausel« der Europäischen Union, Zeitschrift für ausländisches Arbeits- und 
Sozialrecht, 2002, pp. 319-359, at 354. 
69  Article 8 (1) (b) of Regulation 732/2008. 
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various exceptions that the preceding regulation granted to the beneficiary 
countries. Under the old regulation, a country which had only ratified 14 out of 
the 16 human rights conventions of Annex III could be granted the additional 
preferences if it was prevented from ratifying the remaining two by “constitu-
tional constraints”.70 It had, however, to ratify the remaining conventions at a 
later stage. Regarding the “good governance” conventions, the countries had 
the possibility to postpone the ratification of four out of the eleven conventions 
until 31 August 2008.71 These exceptions were meant to facilitate the use of 
the GSP+ during the first three years of the programme.72 Countries requesting 
admission to the GSP+ arrangement under the new Regulation 732/2008 will, 
henceforth, have to ratify and to implement all 27 conventions referred to by 
the Annex.73 
By and large, it seems that, compared to former GSP+ arrangements, the 
requirements of GSP+ have been raised considerably. One may ask whether 
the large number of conventions to which GSP+ refers may hamper the effec-
tive application and supervision of the social clause.74 A high number of con-
ventions means a larger workload for the Commission which examines 
whether a country conforms to the respective conventions. This gives rise to 
doubts whether the Commission will examine countries’ situations thoroughly 
in order to abide by its time schedule. 
b) The admission procedure and legal effects 
In order to be admitted to GSP+, a number of procedural steps have to be fol-
lowed. First of all, a country that wishes to benefit from the additional prefer-
                                                 
70  Article 9 (2) of Regulation 980/2005. 
71  Article 9 (1) I of Regulation 980/2005. During the legislative process European Par-
liament had argued for an alternative provision requiring that the country “actually 
begins procedures to ratify and effectively implement all the conventions listed in 
Annex III within 4 years after first being granted the special incentive arrangement”, 
European Parliament legislative resolution on the proposal for a Council regulation 
applying a scheme of generalised tariff preferences (COM(2004)0699 – 
COM(2005)0043 – C6-0001/2005 – 2004/0242(CNS)), P6_TA(2005)0066, adopted 
9 March 2005 (hereafter “European Parliament legislative resolution of 9 March 
2005”), Amendment 19. 
72  Proposal for a Council Regulation applying a scheme of generalised tariff prefer-
ences for the period from 1 January 2009 to 31 December 2011 and amending Regu-
lations (EC) No 552/97, No 1933/2006 and Commission Regulations (EC) No 
964/2007 and No 1100/2006, COM(2007) 857 final of 21 December 2007, p. 3. 
73  See Article 8 (1) (a) of Regulation 732/2008. 
74  Lopez-Jurado, op cit., p. 476. 
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ences is required to hand in a written request to the Commission.75 
Countries may choose between two deadlines for the submission of their 
request, either 31 October 2008 or 30 April 2010.76 The additional preferences 
may become effective from 1 January 2009 or from 1 July 2010, respectively. 
This is a divergence from the preceding 2005 Regulation, which only provided 
for one deadline at the very beginning, when the regulation takes effect.77 The 
limitation was criticised for unnecessarily precluding countries from the spe-
cial preferences and thereby reducing its potential influence on those coun-
tries’ political situation.78 The new regulation seems to represent a more suit-
able compromise between the interests of the potential beneficiary countries in 
having a flexible procedure and the Commission’s interest in terms of adminis-
trative efficiency. 
When submitting their request, countries have to provide detailed informa-
tion concerning the ratification and implementation of relevant conventions. 
They also must state their willingness to accept the relevant supervisory 
mechanisms.79 The Commission then examines the application in consultation 
with the GSP-Committee.80 This committee consists of one representative for 
each Member State and is chaired by a representative of the Commission.81 
The Commission has to “take into account the findings of the relevant interna-
tional organizations”.82 It follows from this that the Commission has to con-
sider the findings of the international organisations, but is not bound by 
them.83 Furthermore, the Commission may consider all “other relevant 
sources”. 
Unlike the old GSP Regulation from 2001, the new Regulation does not 
oblige the Commission to publish the requests by the developing countries.84 
Nor is the Commission required to invite all interested parties to provide their 
observations. This is regrettable as NGOs often possess comprehensive and 
valuable information about the human rights situation in a country. Such in-
                                                 
75  Article 9 (2) of Regulation 732/2008. 
76  Article 8 (1) (a) of Regulation 732/2008. 
77  Article 10 (1) (a) of Regulation 980/2005. 
78  See European Parliament legislative resolution of 9 March 2005, Amendment 22. 
79  Article 9 (2) of Regulation 732/2008. 
80  Article 10 (2) and 27 (4) of Regulation 732/2008. 
81  Article 3 and 7 of Decision 1999/468. 
82  Article 10 (1) of Regulation 732/2008. The preceding Regulation 2501/2001 re-
ferred to the jurisprudence of international organisations only in its 29th Recital. 
83  See also Herkommer, op cit., p. 203 regarding Regulation 2501/2001. 
84  See Article 16 (1) of Regulation 2501/2001. 
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formation may be particularly valuable in cases where the country has only 
recently ratified the Conventions since the concerned international organisa-
tions often do not yet have sufficient information to assess these cases. The 
fact that a provision on participation of civil society has been expressly re-
moved also raises some doubts regarding the Community’s attitude to trans-
parency and openness to cooperation.85 While it may be presumed that the 
Commission still maintains an informal dialogue with some of the major 
NGOs in that respect, it would have been desirable to publicise ongoing ex-
aminations. This would ensure that all interested parties could submit their 
views, which would be particularly important for smaller NGOs that may not 
be aware of the ongoing examination procedures.86 
Once the Commission has taken a decision on the request, it shall inform 
the country concerned and publish a list of the countries benefiting from the 
GSP+.87 In case the request has been refused, the Commission shall also pub-
lish the reasons for refusal.88 However, the Commission is not obliged to give 
reasons in case it approves the request. As a consequence, the Commission 
does not provide any factual evidence to justify its decision and does not state 
to what extent it used the reports of international organisations. This is all the 
more problematic as the decisions of the Commission are, as will be shown 
below, not above suspicion. It would therefore be appropriate to give the pub-
lic the possibility to understand how the decisions were taken. Calls on the 
Commission and the Council to increase transparency, in particular by the 
European Parliament have, up to now, been constantly ignored.89 
                                                 
85  For an overview about the Commission’s attitude towards transparency consider 
<http://ec.europa.eu/commission_barroso/kallas/transparency_en.htm>, last checked 
on 5 March 2009. 
86  The European Parliament therefore demanded that the Commission “shall verify the 
information received with the requesting country or with any other relevant sources 
including the European Parliament and representatives of civil society, including the 
social partners”, see European Parliament, legislative resolution of 5 June 2008 on the 
proposal for a Council regulation applying a scheme of generalised tariff preferences 
for the period from 1 January 2009 to 31 December 2011 and amending Regulations 
(EC) No 552/97, No 1933/2006 and Commission Regulations (EC) No 964/2007 and 
No 1100/2006 (COM(2007)0857 – C6-0051/2008 – 2007/0289(CNS)) (hereafter 
“European Parliament legislative resolution of 5 June 2008”), Amendment 20. 
87  Article 10 (3) of Regulation 732/2008. 
88  Article 10 (4) of Regulation 732/2008. The possibility to postpone a decision if the 
country needs more time to comply with a decision (see Article 16 (4) of Regulation 
2501/2001) does not longer exist. 
89  See European Parliament legislative resolution of 5 June 2008, Amendment 18, 20 
and 22. 
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Also, the length of the examination period raises questions. According to 
the new Regulation, the examination should be completed within a period of 
one and a half months.90 This period appears to be very short considering that 
normally more than a dozen countries can be expected to apply for admission 
or re-admission to the GSP+. Furthermore, in each case the Commission has to 
examine the application of no less than 27 conventions, many of which are of a 
quite complex character. This is somewhat surprising, given the fact that the 
GSP Regulation of 2001, which only referred to eight conventions, provided 
for a year-long examination period with the possibility of extension; in practice 
this resulted in an examination period ranging between one and three years.91 
One may ask how the Commission manages to cope with an increased work-
load without imperilling the quality of the examination process.92 
If a country has finally been admitted to GSP+, it is entitled to additional 
tariff preferences beyond those of the general arrangement. More specifically, 
all ad valorem duties on products listed in Annex II of the Regulation are sus-
pended.93 The same is true for all specific duties except for those products that 
                                                 
90  Article 9 (1) of Regulation 732/2008. 
91  Article 16 (5) of Regulation 2501/2001. The Request of Russia was published 30 
July 1999, see Notice regarding request submitted by the Russian Federation to take 
advantage of the special incentive arrangements concerning labour rights, OJ C 218 
of 30.7.1999, p. 2; the examination procedure ended with a postponement of the fi-
nal decision to give Russian government more time to conform to the relevant inter-
national conventions; this decision was published on 13 November 2002, see: Com-
mission Decision 2002/902/EC of 13 November 2002 on postponing the decision on 
the request of the Russian Federation for the special incentive arrangements for the 
protection of labour rights, OJ L 312, 15.11.2002, p. 27. The request of Sri Lanka 
was published 19 April 2002, see Notice regarding the request submitted by the 
Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka in order to benefit from the special in-
centive arrangements concerning labour rights, OJ C 95, 19.4.2002, p. 14; the 
Commission published the decision on admission 29 December 2003, see Commis-
sion Regulation (EC) No 2342/2003 of 29 December 2003 granting the Democratic 
Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka the benefit of the special incentive arrangements for 
the protection of labour rights, OJ L 346, 31.12.2003, pp. 34-35. In the case of the 
Republic of Moldavia the publication of the request took place 22 June 1999, see 
Notice regarding request submitted by the Republic of Moldova to take advantage of 
the special incentive arrangements concerning labour rights, OJ C 176, 22.6.1999, p. 
13; the decision on admission was published 25 July 2000, see Commission Regula-
tion (EC) No 1649/2000 of 25 July 2000 granting the Republic of Moldova the be-
nefit of the special incentive arrangements concerning labour rights, see OJ L 189, 
27.7.2000, p. 13. 
92  It is hereby presumed that the personal resources of the Commission have not been 
significantly raised for the duration of the examination period. 
93  Article 7 (1) of Regulation 732/2008. 
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are subject to both specific duties and ad valorem duties.94 GSP+ thus provides 
for a considerable advantage in comparison to the general arrangement. Also 
the scope and the level of the preferences granted have been increased since 
2001. This has, in the view of some, strongly increased the attractiveness of the 
GSP+.95 However, it should be noted that the GSP+ is subject to a number of 
practical obstacles hampering the efficiency of the GSP system in general. A 
number of products, mainly in the agricultural sphere, are wholly or partly ex-
cluded from the GSP, many of which are of crucial importance for developing 
countries. Furthermore, the formalities that companies have to fulfil in order to 
prove that their products originate from a certain beneficiary country (rules of 
origin) are very complex and are likely to discourage importers from making 
use of the GSP.96 Hence, the analysis of the benefits of GSP+ presents a mixed 
picture. 
Even after granting the additional preferences, Commission is obliged to 
continue to review the status of the conventions’ ratification and implementa-
tion. The additional preferences may be withdrawn if the beneficiary country 
ceases to fulfil the requirements of GSP+.97 
c) Legal protection against the admission decision 
Given the economic importance of the tariff preferences for the developing 
countries, the question arises whether the countries concerned may bring legal 
action against a decision of the Commission to refuse admission. According to 
Article 230 (4) EC, “any natural or legal person may, under the same condi-
tions, institute proceedings against a decision addressed to that person or 
against a decision which, although in the form of a regulation or a decision ad-
dressed to another person, is of direct and individual concern to the former”. 
                                                 
94  Article 7 (2) of Regulation 732/2008. Slightly less generous tariff reductions exist 
with regard to certain confectionery products not containing cocoa where the Com-
mon Customs Tariff is limited to a specific duty of 16 percent of the customs value. 
95  For a more detailed assessment of this question see Grynberg, R./Qalo, V., Labour 
Standards in US and EU Preferential Trading Agreements, Journal of World Trade 
2006, pp. 619-653 at 647. 
96  See Vincent, Philippe, Le nouveau système communautaire des préférences généra-
lisées, Cahiers de droit européen, 2005, pp. 683-704 at 702. For more information on 
the rules of origin see Communication of the Commission from 18 December 2003, 
Green Paper on the Future of Rules of Origin in Preferential Trade Arrangements, 
COM (2003) 787 final. 
97  Article 8 (3) of Regulation 732/2008. The procedure tallies with the general with-
drawal procedure described below. 
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Neither the European Court of Justice nor the Court of First Instance have 
dealt with the question as to whether a third country can be considered a “legal 
person” for the purpose of this article. Unlike Article 33 (2) of the Treaty Es-
tablishing the European Coal and Steel Community,98 Article 230 EC uses a 
rather wide wording (“any person”). Academics have therefore constructed 
Article 230 (4) EC in a broad way so as to extend its application to different 
types of public entities.99 One might argue that third countries may not be re-
garded as legal persons under national law.100 However, the Court has already 
recognised that third states may submit third party observations.101 It is, there-
fore, likely that the Court will also accept that a third state could act as a com-
plainant under Article 230 (4) EC.102 
As regards the admissibility requirements pertaining to the type of act tar-
geted, the complaint has to be directed against a decision or a regulation of the 
Commission. In the latter case, the requirements are somewhat stricter since 
here the complainant must also prove that the regulation is “of direct and indi-
vidual concern” to the individual. This is currently unproblematic since the 
admission decisions are taken in the form of a decision.103 But even if the 
Commission used the legal form of a decision, as it used to do under one of the 
                                                 
98  According to Article 33 (2) of the Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel 
Community undertakings and their associations the only entities being allowed to 
bring able to bring action against a decision of the Commission. 
99  The Court has among others accepted the complaints of Belgian regions; see Judg-
ment of Joined cases of 8 March 1988, 62/87 and 72/87, Exécutif régional wallon 
and SA Glaverbel v Commission of the European Communities, ECR 1988, p. 1573. 
100  Gaitanides, C., Artikel 230 EGV, in: Groeben, H.v.d./Schwarze, J. (eds.): 
Kommentar zum Vertrag über die Europäische Union und zur Gründung der 
Europäischen Gemeinschaft (6th edition), Nomos (Baden-Baden) 2004, para. 45. 
101  Order of the Court of 23 February 1983, Chris International Foods Ltd v Commis-
sion of the European Communities ECR 1983/417 of February 23 1983. 
102  Support for this view can be found in English, French and German literature, Le-
naerts, K./Arts, D./Maselis, I., Procedural Law of the European Union (2nd edition), 
Sweet & Maxwell (London) 2006, para. 7.065, footnote 213; Simon, Denys, Le sys-
tème juridique communautaire (3rd edition), Presses Universitaires de France (Paris) 
2007, para. 423 and Geiger, R., Vertrag über die Europäische Union und Vertrag 
zur Gründung der Europäischen Gemeinschaft, Artikel 230 EGV (4th edition), 
München (C.H. Beck 2004), para. 16. 
103  Commission Decision 2008/938/EC of 9 December 2008 on the list of the benefici-
ary countries which qualify for the special incentive arrangement for sustainable de-
velopment and good governance, provided for in Council Regulation (EC) 
No 732/2008 applying a scheme of generalised tariff preferences for the period from 
1 January 2009 to 31 December 2011, OJ L 334, 12.12.2008, pp. 90-91. 
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GSP Regulation of 2001,104 this would not bring about any significant changes 
in terms of admissibility. As the ECJ stated in its “Plaumann decision”, the 
term “direct and individual concern” means that the regulation affects the 
complainant in a similar way to that of an individual decision.105 As for the 
Commission’s decisions on the grant of additional preferences, these legal acts 
always mention the names of the specific countries, providing clear evidence 
of the individual character of the decision.106 The GSP+ decisions of the 
Commission therefore affect individuals directly and individually, regardless 
of whether they are formally adopted as a regulation or a decision. 
The decision also affects foreign trade interests of the third countries as the 
decision has a direct impact on their opportunities to export their products to 
the Community. They concern, hence, a concrete interest of the third countries, 
which is a third criterion for legal admissibility under Article 230 (4) EC. It 
follows that decisions about the admission of a country to the GSP+ may in 
principle be legally contested. The competent court in this respect is the Court 
of First Instance (CFI).107 Possible reasons for bringing an action of annulment 
may be the infringement of essential procedural requirements,108 the violation 
of superior law,109 or misuse of powers by the Commission.110 
By contrast, the situation is different with respect to companies active in the 
developing countries concerned. They are not the addressees of the decisions 
or regulations. It is also impossible to consider them as individually concerned 
by a GSP+ decision, since it affects every undertaking in the country con-
cerned.111 It follows that such companies do not have the right to file a com-
plaint under Article 230 (4) EC against GSP+ decisions. 
                                                 
104  See Regulation 2342/2003 and Regulation No 1649/2000 of 25 July 2000. 
105  ECJ Judgment of 15 July 1963, case 25/62, Plaumann & Co. v Commission of the 
European Economic Community, ECR, 1963, p. 95. 
106  See Judgment of 17 June 1980, joint cases C-789 and 790/79, Calpak SpA and So-
cietà Emiliana Lavorazione Frutta SpA v Commission of the European Communi-
ties, ECR 1980, p. 1949, para 7. 
107  Ehricke, Ulrich, Artikel 230 EGV, in: Streinz, Rudolph: Vertrag über die 
Europäische Union und Vertrag zur Gründung der Europäischen Gemeinschaft, 
C.H.Beck (Munich) 2003, para. 37 with further references. 
108  Lenaerts/Arts/Maselis, op cit., para. 7.135 et seq. 
109  Ibid., para. 7.150 et seq. 
110  Ehricke, op cit., para. 79. 
111  See further ibid., paras. 56-59. 
 21
d) Application in practice 
i) The current situation 
While the GSP+ was in its first years only sparsely used,112 fifteen countries 
benefited from the additional preferences during the first period of the ex-
tended GSP+ from 1 January 2006 to 31 December 2008.113 These countries 
were: Bolivia, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Georgia, Guatemala, Honduras, 
Sri Lanka, Republic of Moldova, Mongolia, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, El Sal-
vador, and Venezuela.114 During this period two countries were removed from 
this list. This also concerned Chile, which had concluded a bilateral agreement 
with the EC, providing for more generous market access than GSP+.115 Fur-
thermore, the Republic of Moldova was removed from GSP+ after the entry 
into force of an arrangement of more generous “autonomous tariff preferences” 
in early 2008.116 The new arrangement for Moldova is subject to compliance 
with the conditions of the 27 international conventions referred to by the 
                                                 
112  During 1998 and 2005 only two countries benefited from the GSP+ arrangement, i.e. 
Sri Lanka and Moldova. See Regulation 2342/2003 and Regulation 1649/2000. See 
further Dispersyn, M., La dimension sociale dans le Système des préférences (SPG) 
de l’Union Européenne, Revue de droit de l’ULB 2001, pp. 87-210. 
113  It should be noted in this respect, that these countries were admitted to the GSP+ of 
2005 even before the substantial examination by the Commission of the country’s 
situation had started. This was possible because of 7th Recital of Regulation 
980/2005, which allowed for admitting countries on a provisional basis which al-
ready met its requirements. However, since there is no evidence that the countries 
concerned were obliged to hand in any preliminary information or other supporting 
documents, it is unclear how the Commission could know that these countries “fulfil 
already the criteria under the special arrangement for sustainable development and 
good governance”. 
114  See Sole Article of Commission Decision 2005/924/EC of 21 December 2005 on the 
list of the beneficiary countries which qualify for the special incentive arrangement 
for sustainable development and good governance, provided for by Article 26(e) of 
Council Regulation (EC) No 980/2005 applying a scheme of generalised tariff pref-
erences, OJ L 337, 22.12.2005, p. 50, (hereafter: Commission Decision 924/2005). 
115  See Article 1 of Commission Regulation (EC) No 566/2007 of 24 May 2007 remov-
ing the Republic of Chile from the list of beneficiary countries in Annex I to Council 
Regulation (EC) No 980/2005 applying a scheme of generalised tariff preferences, 
OJ L 133, 25.5.2007, p. 12. 
116  See Council Regulation (EC) No 55/2008 of 21 January 2008 introducing autono-
mous trade preferences for the Republic of Moldova and amending Regulation (EC) 
No 980/2005 and Commission Decision 2005/924/EC, OJ L 20, 24.1.2008, pp. 1-8 
(hereafter Regulation 55/2008). 
 22
GSP+.117 
On 9 December 2008, the Commission published the list of the countries 
that will benefit from the GSP from 1 January 2009 to 31 December 2011.118 
In addition to the 13 countries, which were covered by GSP+ until December 
2008,119 the new list included also Armenia, Azerbaijan and Paraguay. One 
may be surprised that so many countries have been admitted to the GSP+, de-
spite the fact that GSP+ requires the implementation of 27 quite demanding 
conventions. Indeed, a closer look at the human rights situation in the countries 
concerned suggests that the high number of beneficiary countries is, at least 
partly, due to an inaccurate assessment by the Commission. In various cases 
the decisions of the Commission are not in line with the findings of the inter-
national supervisory bodies. This is illustrated, inter alia, by ILO Conventions 
No. 87 and 98 on the freedom of association and collective bargaining. These 
Conventions are subject to one of the most meticulous supervisory mecha-
nisms currently in place, and allow for a comprehensive analysis of the Com-
mission’s admission decision in terms of international standards.120 
A striking example for this inconsistency is the case of Colombia with re-
gard to which ILO supervisory bodies have been criticizing the permanent 
state of insecurity and impunity121 that gave rise to numerous politically moti-
vated murders and other acts of violence against trade union members and 
leaders as “preventing the free exercise of trade union rights” guaranteed.122 
                                                 
117  Article 2 (1) (f) of Regulation 55/2008. 
118  Article 1 of Decision 2008/938. 
119  Panama has not been readmitted to GSP+ because it submitted its application after 
the deadline of 31 October 2008, see the Commission’s Press Release of Brussels, 9 
December 2008, “The EC Special Incentive Arrangement for Sustainable Develop-
ment and Good Governance”, available at   
<http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2008/december/tradoc_141663.pdf>, last 
checked 5 March 2009. 
120  Compliance with the principles on freedom of association and collective bargaining 
is not only supervised by the ILO Committee of Experts but, additionally, by the 
Committee of Freedom of Association, a tripartite body consisting of employers, 
workers and government representatives which receives complaints from trade un-
ions and employers, see on this Tajgman, D./Kurtis, K., Freedom of Association: A 
User’s guide – Standards, Principles and Procedures of the International Labour 
Organisation, International Labour Office (Geneva) 2000, p. 45 et seq. 
121  ILCCR: Examination of individual case concerning Convention No. 87, Freedom of 
Association and Protection of the Right to Organise, 1948 Colombia (ratification: 
1976), published: 2005, Conclusions. 
122  Case No. 1787 (Colombia), Report No. 343 (Vol. LXXXVIX, 2006, Series B, No. 
3), para. 422. Even stronger wording was found by the ILO Conference Committee 
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Besides, also a number of elements of the Colombian labour legislation are in 
conflict with ILO Convention No. 87.123 While the Colombian government has 
made certain progress in terms of remedying the situation, it is clear from the 
ILO Committee of Experts that the situation in Colombia cannot yet be consid-
ered in line with the ILO Conventions.124 Similar problems exist with regard to 
Guatemala where the ILO supervisory bodies pointed to the permanent climate 
of violence and impunity coupled with inefficiency of the judiciary, and re-
quested the government to “take the necessary measures to guarantee full re-
spect for the human rights of trade unionists” under ILO Convention No 87.125 
Serious problems in this regard can also be identified in the case of Georgia 
where legislation on strikes, collective bargaining and trade unions was re-
proached for failing to conform to ILO Conventions No 87 and No 98.126 Also, 
                                                                                                                                                     
in 2003 which noted “with deep concern” “a serious obstacle to the free exercise of 
the freedom of association guaranteed by the Convention“ and “addressed an urgent 
call to the Government to immediately take the measures necessary to guarantee the 
full implementation of the Convention in both law and practice“. ILCCR: Examina-
tion of individual case concerning Convention No. 87, Freedom of Association and 
Protection of the Right to Organise, 1948 Colombia (ratification: 1976), published: 
2003, Conclusions. 
123  See in particular CEACR: Individual Observation concerning Freedom of Associa-
tion and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention, 1948 (No. 87) Colombia 
(ratification: 1976), published: 2006. 
124  See CEACR: Individual Observation concerning Freedom of Association and Pro-
tection of the Right to Organise Convention, 1948 (No. 87) Colombia (ratification: 
1976), published: 2008. Here, there Committee of Experts „again urges the Gov-
ernment to take the necessary steps to ensure the right to life and security of trade 
union leaders and members so that they may fully exercise the rights guaranteed by 
the Convention“. 
125  See CEACR: Individual Observation concerning Freedom of Association and Pro-
tection of the Right to Organise Convention, 1948 (No. 87) Guatemala (ratification: 
1952), published: 2008. The Conference Committee on the Application of Standards 
used even stronger words by requesting the Government „to take the necessary 
measures to bring the legislation and practice into full conformity with the provi-
sions of the Convention“, ILCCR: Examination of individual case concerning Con-
vention No. 87, Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise, 
1948 Guatemala (ratification: 1952), published: 2005, Conclusions. 
126  See for example CEACR: Individual Direct Request concerning Freedom of Asso-
ciation and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention, 1948 (No. 87) Georgia 
(ratification: 1999), submitted: 2007, CEACR: Individual Observation concerning 
Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention, 1948 
(No. 87) Georgia (ratification: 1999), published: 2006. CEACR: Individual Direct 
Request concerning Convention No. 98, Right to Organise and Collective Bargain-
ing, 1949 Georgia (ratification: 1993), submitted: 2005, CEACR: Individual Direct 
Request concerning Convention No. 98, Right to Organise and Collective Bargain-
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a number of serious acts of intimidation against trade unions were committed 
by state authorities.127 
In addition, the case of El Salvador is of particular interest as this country had 
been admitted without having ratified and implemented ILO Conventions No 87 
and No 98, under one of the abovementioned exceptions. The preferences had, 
however, been granted under the precondition that El Salvador would make up 
for this within a specified period of time. Later, when El Salvador had ratified 
both Conventions, the Council granted unconditional admission to the GSP+ to 
El Salvador.128 It seems that the Commission had overlooked the fact that na-
tional legislation in El Salvador did not provide any protection against anti-
union discrimination required by ILO Convention No 98.129 Also, the fact that 
the ILO Committee on the Freedom of Association found the refusal of the Sal-
vadorian government to grant legal personality to certain types of workers to be 
“incompatible with the requirements of Convention No. 87“130 apparently did 
not impact the Commission’s decision in 2005. 
In all these cases, ILO supervisory bodies established serious deficits re-
garding trade union’s freedom of association and their right to organise, and 
held that the countries in question did not fully apply the relevant ILO Conven-
tions. Bearing in mind that the GSP+ only applies to those countries which 
have already implemented the conventions, the admission decisions of the 
Commission seem to be at odds with the findings of the ILO bodies. It is true 
that there may be defendable political reasons to grant the preferences to these 
countries, for example where the country has made certain progress in terms of 
human rights improvement; however, such practice is incompatible with the 
criteria stipulated by the GSP Regulation. In light of this, it is suggested that its 
                                                                                                                                                     
ing, 1949 Georgia (ratification: 1993), submitted: 2004. CEACR: Individual Direct 
Request concerning Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention, 1949 
(No. 98) Georgia (ratification: 1993), submitted: 2007. 
127  CEACR: Individual Observation concerning Freedom of Association and Protection 
of the Right to Organise Convention, 1948 (No. 87) Georgia (ratification: 1999), 
published: 2006, see also Committee of Freedom of Association (hereafter CFA), 
Georgia (Case No. 2387) Report No. 338, (Vol. LXXXVIII, 2005, Series B, No. 3), 
para. 858 et seq. 
128  Council Decision 2006/978/EC of 19 December 2006 on the granting of the special 
incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance beyond 1 
January 2007 to the Republic of El Salvador, OJ L 365, 21.12.2006, p. 86. 
129  CFA , El Salvador (Case No. 2423), 344th Report, para. 938. See further CFA Case 
No. 2514 (El Salvador), Report No. 346, (Vol. LXXXVX, 2007, Series B, No. 2), 
para. 959. 
130  CFA Case No. 2423 (El Salvador), Report No. 344 (Vol. LXXXVX, 2007, Series B, 
No. 1), paras. 929 f. 
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legality should be put under question. Any developing country that has not 
been admitted to GSP+ could, on this basis, bring an action against the Com-
mission to annul the decision denying admission. 
Also, from a political perspective, the Commission’s practice seems dubi-
ous. As Orbie notes, almost all countries that were admitted to the new GSP+ 
in 2005, including El Salvador, Guatemala and Colombia, had already bene-
fited from the special arrangement to combat drug production and trafficking 
under the old Regulation of 2001. It seems that after the WTO Appellate Body 
had declared this arrangement as incompatible with WTO-law, these countries 
were simply shifted from one arrangement to the other.131 One cannot, there-
fore, help thinking that the Commission’s decisions were driven by an interest 
to assure the continued granting of additional preferences to the countries in-
cluded in the drug arrangement.132 
ii) The attitude of the Commission and first reactions 
The Commission’s attitude towards this situation is not exactly clear. In a staff 
working document from 2007, the Commission admitted that “as far as effec-
tive implementation is concerned, the reports of UN and ILO monitoring bod-
ies reveal a mixed picture”.133 By contrast, in a staff working document from 
                                                 
131  See Annex I of Regulation 2501/2001. El Salvador and Guatemala have benefited 
from the predecessor of the drug arrangement since 1992. Many countries which had 
profited from the drug arrangement before had urged the Community to maintain 
their status as regards trade preferences, see for example the statements of the trade 
representatives of Honduras and El Salvador, see Trade Policy Review Body, Min-
utes of Meeting of 18 January 2005, WT/TPR/M/136, Trade Policy Review Euro-
pean Communities, paras. 109 and 111. 
132  Orbie suggests that the new GSP+ of 2005 was nothing more than a face-lifted ver-
sion of the old drug arrangement, see Orbie, J., The Social Dimension of Globaliza-
tion and European Union Development Policy, Paper delivered on the occasion of 
the EUSA Tenth Biennial International Conference, Montreal, Canada, 17 to 19 
May 2007, available under:   
<http://www.unc.edu/euce/eusa2007/papers/orbie-j-07g.pdf>, p. 8. Some also con-
jecture that the main consideration for the admission of Pakistan to the special ar-
rangement to combat drug production and trafficking of Regulation 2501/2001 was 
to acknowledge Pakistan’s efforts regarding the struggle against terrorism, Shaffer, 
G./Apea, Y., Institutional Choice in the Generalized System of Preferences Case: 
Who Decides the Conditions for Trade Preferences? The Law and Politics of Rights, 
Journal of World Trade 2005, pp. 977-1008 at 995. 
133  See Commission staff working document – Accompanying document to the Council 
Regulation applying a scheme of generalised tariff preferences for the years 2009-
2011 – Impact assessment report, SEC(2007) 1727 final, p. 12. 
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2008, the Commission states: “As far as effective implementation is concerned 
the recommendations of the ILO and UN monitoring bodies […] reveal vari-
ous shortcomings in the implementation process but in general demonstrate a 
satisfactory state of play.”134 
Despite the “satisfactory state of play”, in 2008, the Commission initiated 
for the first time two investigations with a view to withdrawing the additional 
preferences. The first one concerns El Salvador’s compliance with ILO Con-
vention No. 87. The reason for this inquiry was a recent judgment of the Sal-
vadorian Supreme Court that declared a number of the provisions of this con-
vention incompatible with the national constitution.135 The second case deals 
with Sri Lanka. Here, the initiation of the investigation was due to doubts con-
cerning the implementation of a number of UN human rights conventions, in 
particular the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the Con-
vention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment and the Convention on the Rights of the Child.136 Here, the Com-
mission relied on “statements of the United Nations (UN), as well as informa-
tion from other relevant publicly available sources, including non-
governmental organisations”,137 and concluded that there were “sufficient 
grounds for opening an investigation”.138 Both cases are still under examina-
tion. 
The initiation of these two investigations is encouraging from a human 
                                                 
134  See GSP+-Report on the status of ratification and recommendations by monitoring 
bodies concerning conventions of annex III of the Council Regulation (EC) No 
980/2005 of 27 June 2005 applying a scheme of generalised tariff preferences (the 
GSP regulation) in the countries that were granted the Special incentive arrangement 
for sustainable development and good governance (GSP+) by Commission Decision 
of 21 December 2005, COM(2008) 656 final of 21.10.2008. 
135  See Commission Decision 2008/316/EC of 31 March 2008 providing for the initia-
tion of an investigation pursuant to Article 18(2) of Council Regulation (EC) 
No 980/2005 with respect to the protection of the freedom of association and the 
right to organise in El Salvador, OJ L 108, 18.4.2008, p. 29 (hereafter Decision 
2008/316). 
136  1st Recital of Commission Decision 2008/803/EC of 14 October 2008 providing for 
the initiation of an investigation pursuant to Article 18(2) of Council Regulation 
(EC) No 980/2005 with respect to the effective implementation of certain human 
rights conventions in Sri Lanka Official Journal L 277, 18.10.2008 pp. 34-35 (here-
after Decision 2008/316). 
137  Notice pursuant to Article 19(1) of Council Regulation (EC) No 980/2005 of the 
initiation of an investigation with respect to the effective implementation of certain 
human rights conventions in Sri Lanka, Official Journal C 265, 18.10.2008, p. 1. 
138  4th Recital of Decision 2008/803 and 4th Recital of Decision 2008/316. 
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rights perspective. However, it also gives rise to a number of questions. First, 
one may wonder why the violations committed by Colombia, Guatemala and 
Georgia have not received the same attention as other instances of breach.139 
Furthermore, it is not comprehensible why El Salvador and Sri Lanka have 
been re-admitted to GSP+ in the first place. The GSP Regulation makes it clear 
that only countries that have implemented these conventions may be granted 
additional preferences.140 Therefore, it would have been reasonable not to ad-
mit these two countries to the GSP+ until such doubts concerning the imple-
mentation process are dispelled. The approach taken by the Commission does 
not therefore seem to be entirely consistent. 
2. Does GSP+ comply with WTO-law? 
a) The legality of the substantial admission criteria of GSP+ 
The conditions for the substantial admission criteria to GSP+ give rise to a 
number of complex questions with respect to their compatibility with the Ena-
bling Clause. In particular, it is unclear whether it is compatible with WTO-
law to make additional preferences conditional on the compliance of interna-
tional conventions with the Enabling Clause. In the aftermath of the WTO Re-
port on the drug arrangement a number of academics considered that the new 
GSP+ meets the requirements of the Enabling Clause.141 However, other 
scholars have recently adopted a more critical attitude in this respect.142 
                                                 
139  In this regard, the European Parliament had suggested including a provision, which 
would have obliged the Commission to “regularly check that the commitments of 
beneficiary countries are being honoured and that none of the reasons set out in Ar-
ticle 15(1) and (2) and Article 16 (1) and (2) for the temporary withdrawal of prefer-
ential arrangements applies”. This could prevent countries from continuing to bene-
fit from GSP+ if they no longer fulfil the relevant requirements; see European Par-
liament legislative resolution of 5 June 2008, Amendment 23. 
140  Article 8 (1) of Regulation 732/2008. 
141  This view is defended by Howse, R./Langlile, B./Burda, J., The World Trade Or-
ganization and Labour Rights: Man Bites Dog, in: Leary, V. A./Warner, D. (eds.): 
Social Issues, Globalisation and International Institutions. Labour Rights and the 
EU, ILO, OECD and WTO, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers (Leiden/Boston) 2006, pp. 
157-221 at 217; Hepple, B., Labour Law and Global Trade, Hart Publishing (Ox-
ford/Portland, Oregon) 2005, p 148. 
142  See in particular Bartels, WTO Legality 2007, op cit.; Gruszczynski, L., The EC 
General System of Preferences and International Obligations in the Area of Trade – 
The Never-Ending Story, (August 3, 2008). Available at SSRN:  
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=1199502>, last checked 5 March 2009. 
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In order to assess the conditions stipulated by the “Human Rights and Good 
Governance Clause”, two criteria seem to be important. First, there must be a 
presence of “development, financial and trade needs of developing Countries” 
which has to be established according to an objective standard.143 Second, the 
presence of a “sufficient nexus” between the GSP preferential arrangement and 
the developing need is required.144 
i) International Conventions as an admission condition for GSP+ 
Many issues are controversial in this respect. Some scholars argue that the 
term “development need” should be understood in a purely economic manner, 
since the preamble of the Enabling Clause only refers to economic aims.145 
However, the Appellate Body made clear that the preamble of the WTO 
Agreement refers to “sustainable development”, which is a much wider con-
cept.146 As the WTO Appellate Body stated, attention should also be paid to 
other international legal instruments which, as Bartels points out,147 would 
lead us to the 1986 UN Declaration on the Right to Development, which has a 
much wider approach, encompassing the political and social dimension of de-
velopment.148 It seems therefore quite probable that the Appellate Body will 
accept political considerations as development aims under the Enabling 
                                                 
143  WTO Appellate Body Report EC-Tariff Preferences, para. 163. See further Jessen, 
H., WTO-Recht und „Entwicklungsländer“. „Special and Differential Treatment for 
Developing Countries“ im multidimensionalen Wandel des Wirtschaftsvölkerrechts, 
Berliner Wissenschafts-Verlag (Berlin) 2006, p. 577. 
144  WTO Appellate Body Report EC-Tariff Preferences, para. 164. As regards the con-
ditions set out by a social clause, it is implied that the standards of reference have to 
correspond to the capacities of the countries so that developing countries have at le-
ast the possibility to fulfil them. See further Clapham, A./ Martignioni, J. B., “Are 
We There Yet?“ In Search of a Coherent EU Strategy on Labour Rights and Exter-
nal Trade, in: Leary, V. A./Warner, D. (eds.): Social Issues, Globalisation and Inter-
national Institutions.Labour Rights and the EU, ILO, OECD and WTO, Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers (Leiden/Boston) 2006, pp. 233-309 at 291 and Bartels, L., in: 
Charnovitz, S. et al., Internet Roundtable. The Appellate Body’s GSP Decision, in: 
World Trade Review 2004, pp. 239-265 at 248. 
145  Gruszczynski, op cit., p. 12. 
146  WTO Appellate Body Report, United States – Import Prohibition on certain Shrimp 
and Shrimp Products, WT/DS58/AB/R vom 6. November 1998, para. 129. 
147  Bartels, WTO Legality 2007, op cit., p. 875. 
148  UN Declaration on the Right to Development, Adopted by General Assembly reso-
lution 41/128 of 4 December 1986. 
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Clause.149 
As the GSP+ refers directly to the standards set by international organiza-
tions, in principle a good case could be made for its objectivity.150 This seems 
all the more relevant since the UN and the ILO with their near universal mem-
bership is more representative of the international community of states than 
other, more exclusive organisations such as the OECD.151 However, the fact 
that the GSP+ requires developing countries to ratify and implement these 
conventions may be problematic.152 In Bartel’s view, “a country that has not 
ratified a convention may have precisely the same development needs as one 
that has”.153 He therefore argues that the ratification and implementation of a 
convention is not an appropriate criterion to distinguish between countries that 
have, and countries that do not have a certain development need.154 
                                                 
149  Bartels, WTO Legality 2007, op cit., p. 876. 
150  The Appellate Body explicitly mentions the multilateral instruments created by in-
ternational organisations as a possible reference for such a standard, WTO Appellate 
Body Report EC – Tariff Preferences, para. 163. The conventions on human and la-
bour rights seek to improve the political and social situation of the population of a 
given country which may arguably be regarded as an element of sustainable devel-
opment. See Article 1 and 8 of the UN Declaration on the Right to Development of 
1986, Article 2 and 5 of the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development of 
1992, paras. 5, 9 and 25 of the Millennium Declaration of 2000 with regard to hu-
man rights in general and para. 28 of the Johannesburg Declaration on Sustainable 
Development of 2002. The remaining conventions refer to goals that are mentioned 
in the international declarations on development objectives, i.e. the protection of the 
environment. See principle 4 of the Rio Declaration on Environment and Develop-
ment of 1992, paras. 21-23 of the Millennium Declaration of 2000; paras. 5 and 13 
of the Johannesburg Declaration on Sustainable Development of 2002 and para. 23 
of the Millennium Declaration concerning human rights mentions the Kyoto Proto-
col and the Convention on Biological Diversity. The aim of assuring biodiversity is 
further expressly mentioned in para. 18 of the Johannesburg Declaration on Sustain-
able Development of 2002. 
151  See Mason, A. M., The Degeneralization of the Generalized System of Preferences 
(GSP): Questioning the Legitimacy of the U.S. GSP, Duke Law Journal 2004, pp. 
513-547, 541 et seq. 
152  It may be a question of perception whether one considers this a problem under the 
“objectivity criterion”, as Bartels does, or the “positive response” criterion. 
153  Bartels, WTO Legality 2007, op cit., p. 877. 
154  Ibid. In addition to this, Bartels identifies problems with regard to the causal link 
between the preferences granted and the development needs addressed. One example 
would be the Genocide Convention as not all developing countries are in a concrete 
and current need to take action against genocides. Also, the fact that developing 
countries have to ratify and implement Conventions immediately and will be granted 
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This argument is a strong one and certainly shows that the framers of the 
Enabling Clause did not a have in mind a Human Rights and Good Govern-
ance Clause as it is applied by the Community today.155 However, also a dif-
ferent perspective on this matter is possible. The idea of the Community’s 
GSP+ is to grant additional preferences to countries that have satisfied a cer-
tain development need addressed by international conventions.156 Instead of 
providing economic assistance to enable a country to address a given devel-
opment need, it provides an incentive to developing countries that have yet to 
meet the development needs or take the required measures to meet this need.157 
This approach is very different from traditional development assistance, which 
does, however, not mean that it is less efficient. From the Community’s per-
spective, one could argue that certain development problems, in particular 
those in the social or political sphere often depend rather on political will than 
on financial means. Indeed, the development need for freedom of assembly 
without government persecution will be promoted more efficiently by giving 
the country a financial incentive not to do so, than by providing financial assis-
tance to countries that violate this human right. 
From this perspective the GSP+ seems to address these development needs 
in a quite efficient manner. It is therefore not impossible to make the case that 
the Community’s current GSP+ complies with the Enabling Clause. It should 
also be born in mind that a crucial feature of the current GSP is at stake and 
that declaring this element incompatible might mean the end for any additional 
                                                                                                                                                     
the preferences later contributes to the fact it, according to Bartels, unlikely that the 
preferences can be considered a positive response, ibid., p. 880 et seq. 
155  Also McKenzie expresses doubts regarding Bartels’ view. Unfortunately, he only 
states that the ratification requirement is in line with the criterion that the additional 
preferences are available to all developing countries, which does not take into ac-
count the argument made by Bartels, see McKenzie, M., Climate Change and the 
Generalized System of Preferences, Journal of International Economic Law 2008, 
pp. 679-695 at 693. 
156  See also Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parlia-
ment and the European Economic and Social Committee of 7 July 2004, Developing 
countries, international trade and sustainable development: the function of the 
Community's generalised system of preferences (GSP) for the ten-year period from 
2006 to 2015, COM(2004) 461 final, p. 10. 
157  Problems may arise in respect of the ratification criterion as ratification does not 
necessarily say much about the situation in a country. However, ratification is neces-
sary to enable an international organization to examine the status of implementation 
of a convention by the countries concerned. It seems therefore reasonable to main-
tain this criterion. An exception should be made in the case of Macao which, as a 
special territory of China, does not have the international legal capacity to ratify le-
gal conventions Bartels, WTO Legality 2007, op cit., p. 877. 
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preferences under GSP. In this light, it seems likely the Appellate Body will 
adopt a rather careful approach to this question. On the other hand, the above 
analysis also shows that, legally speaking, the GSP+ stands on relatively shaky 
grounds, even with regard to its most fundamental elements. 
ii) The condition of economic “vulnerability” 
Specific problems arise with regard to the condition of economic vulnerability. 
In general, a developing country with a weaker economy has stronger financial 
and trade needs than a country with a more efficient economy. Therefore, an 
objective criterion which relates to the economic situation of the country seems 
to be compatible with the Enabling Clause. An example of this would be the 
first condition of vulnerability, which is that the country must not be a high 
income country, as defined by the World Bank standards. 
However, the two other criteria do not seem to provide for objective stan-
dards. This is particularly true for third criterion according to which the 
amount of imported goods from the beneficiary country to the EC must be less 
than 1 %. Although this criterion says something about the country’s export 
capacity regarding the European Union, it disregards that the country’s export 
capacity may be completely different concerning other import countries, such 
as the United States. The same applies to the diversity criterion, as it only fo-
cuses on exports to the Community. These criteria are thus not necessarily il-
lustrative of the objective development situation of the country and are, hence, 
not in line with the Enabling Clause.158 
b) The admission procedure 
The admission procedure has been subject to political and legal criticism by 
the European Parliament159 and by academics.160 More specifically, it was ar-
                                                 
158  The doubts concerning the vulnerability condition, in particular, with regard to the 
third condition, are shared by McKenzie, Climate Change 2008, op cit., p. 693 and 
Bartels, WTO Legality 2007, op cit., p. 882. 
159  See Draft Opinion of the Committee on Development of the European Parliament on 
the proposal for a Council regulation applying a scheme of generalised tariff prefer-
ences for the period from 1 January 2009 to 31 December 2011 and amending Regu-
lations (EC) n° 552/97, N° 1933/2006 and Commission Regulations (EC) N° 
964/2007 and N° 1100/2006 (COM(2007)0857 – C6-0051/2008 – 
2007/0289(CNS)), Amendment 4. This proposal was taken up in a slightly modified 
version by the European Parliament, see European Parliament legislative resolution 
of 5 June 2008 on the proposal for a Council regulation applying a scheme of gene-
ralised tariff preferences for the period from 1 January 2009 to 31 December 2011 
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gued that the short application period of only three months was not in line with 
the Enabling Clause. The main point of the argument was that, in restricting 
the window for submitting applications, certain countries are precluded from 
benefiting from the GSP+, despite fulfilling its substantive criteria. As pointed 
out above, the WTO Enabling Clause requires that all countries fulfilling the 
development criteria referred to by the special incentive arrangement may 
benefit from the respective additional preferences.161 Indeed, the Appellate 
Body had explicitly held that a special incentive arrangement, which does not 
allow for the admission of new beneficiary countries, is not compatible with 
the Enabling Clause.162 This would be the case if a country is excluded from 
the additional preferences for several years only because it submitted its appli-
cation some months after the assigned deadline. 
It is not exactly clear whether the new Regulation, which adds a second ap-
plication deadline in the mid-life of the GSP+ arrangement, is in line with the 
WTO-law requirements. While it seems that the reason for this amendment 
was precisely to avoid incompatibilities with WTO-law, it still implies waiting 
periods for potential beneficiary countries as high as 18 months. It therefore 
seems that the WTO dispute settlement bodies would find good reasons to find 
the provision not to be in conformity with the Enabling Clause. 
c) Application in practice 
Given the inconsistency of the decisions of the Commission, and its partial ig-
norance towards the findings of the ILO, the question arises whether the 
Commission’s application of the GSP+ is compatible with WTO-law. 
Before addressing this question, it may be useful to set out certain basic 
principles. As has been mentioned above, the Enabling Clause authorises the 
granting of trade preferences to developing countries only if these preferences 
are available to all countries that are in a comparable situation.163 This means 
for a special incentive arrangement that the trade preferences have to be 
granted to all countries that fulfil the relevant criteria. By contrast, admitting 
countries which do not fulfil the relevant criteria to this arrangement would 
                                                                                                                                                     
and amending Regulations (EC) No 552/97, No 1933/2006 and Commission Regula-
tions (EC) No 964/2007 and No 1100/2006 (COM(2007)0857 – C6-0051/2008 – 
2007/0289(CNS), Amendment 19. 
160  Bartels, WTO Legality 2007, op cit., p. 882; Gruszczynski, op cit., p. 20. 
161  WTO Appellate Body Report EC – Tariff Preferences, para. 165. 
162  Ibid., para. 187. 
163  Ibid., para. 165. 
 33
constitute discrimination in two ways: 
1) Discrimination against developing countries that benefit from the 
special incentive arrangement: If a country is admitted to the GSP+ despite 
failing to meet the substantive conditions (“bad country”), it is treated equally 
as those countries that have been admitted for succeeding to fulfil the condi-
tions of the GSP+ (“good country”). In this case the “good country” suffers 
from a disadvantage because it has made a political, and sometimes also finan-
cial, effort to comply with the relevant international conventions, while 
the“bad country” has not made this effort, and nonetheless benefits from the 
same preferential treatment. This leads to an equal treatment of different situa-
tions which may, according to the case law of the WTO Appellate Body, be 
considered as discriminatory.164 
2) Discrimination against developing countries that do not comply with 
the requirements of GSP+: Discrimination arises also between those coun-
tries that do not fulfil the GSP+ criteria but are nonetheless admitted to GSP+ 
(“lucky countries”), and those that do not fulfil the criteria and are not admit-
ted to GSP+ (“unlucky countries”). There is no legitimate reason for distin-
guishing between these countries. Still, one country benefits from additional 
preferences which may mean a considerable economic advantage – possibly 
even to the detriment of the “unlucky country”. This boils down to a different 
treatment of equal situations, in other words discrimination. 
In order to avoid breaches of WTO-law, it is therefore crucial that the 
Commission takes its decisions consistently in strict accordance with the crite-
ria set out in the Human Rights and Good Governance Clause. A simple way 
to assure this is to rely on the relevant findings of the supervisory bodies of the 
relevant international organisations. These organisations have the necessary 
knowledge and experience, and are normally in a position to assess the situa-
tion in countries concerned free from extraneous economic or political consid-
erations. It can therefore be presumed that the Commission applies the Human 
Rights and Good Governance Clause in a non-discriminatory way, if the deci-
sion is in conformity with the findings of the international supervisory bodies. 
This is, however, not the case. As illustrated above, the decisions of the 
Commission deviate, at least partly, from the opinions of the international su-
pervisory bodies. The Commission is, of course, not formally bound by these 
findings. It has, however, to be borne in mind that the party making use of the 
                                                 
164  See WTO Appellate Body Report, United States – Import Prohibition on certain 
Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WT/DS58/AB/R vom 6. November 1998, para. 165. 
Though this reasoning referred to Article XX GATT, it can, arguably, also be applied 
to the Enabling Clause, as this is a general statement on the concept of discrimination; 
see, in this regard, Bartels, GSP Positive Conditionality 2003, op cit., p. 524. 
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“Enabling Clause” has to prove that the legal requirements of the “Enabling 
Clause” have been fulfilled.165 This means that the Community would have to 
demonstrate that the GSP+ system is non-discriminatory. Given the presence 
of international organisation statements that directly contradict its decisions, 
the Community would have to put forward strong arguments in order to show 
that its admission decisions were taken in a non-discriminatory manner. The 
Commission does, however, not give any explanation justifying its decision. It 
appears therefore quite unlikely that the Commission would be able to defend 
its decisions if challenged before the WTO Appellate Body. 
d) The special case of the Republic of Moldova 
Additional questions are raised by the “autonomous preferences” granted to 
Moldova which constitute an exception to the GSP. It appears from the 6th Re-
cital of Regulation 55/2008 that the preferences granted to Moldova regarding 
industrial and agricultural products are more advantageous than those provided 
for by the GSP+. As its name implies, this arrangement is not open to any de-
veloping country fulfilling a certain set of neutral conditions, but is specifically 
designed for one country. It seems obvious that this is at odds with the reason-
ing of the Appellate Body, according to which a Generalised System of Prefer-
ences may not constitute “a closed list of beneficiary countries”.166 
There are serious doubts as to whether the preferences accorded to Moldova 
could at all be considered to be “generalised” preferences in the sense of the 
“Enabling Clause”. This “autonomous” arrangement seems to undermine the 
logic of the GSP, which seeks to provide equal export conditions for develop-
ing countries. It is thus more than questionable whether the arrangement estab-
lishing autonomous preferences for Moldova is compatible with WTO law. An 
illustrative fact in this regard is that neither the Commission Proposal nor the 
Regulation itself makes any mention of the WTO-law implications of this ar-
rangement. 
                                                 
165  The other party only has to “make written submissions in support of this allegation”, 
WTO Appellate Body Report EC-Tariff Preferences, para. 118. 
166  Ibid., paras. 182 and 187. 
 35
IV. Human rights conditionality in the withdrawal clause 
1. How does the human rights withdrawal clause function? 
a) The conditions for withdrawing the preferences 
Regulation 732/2008 contains two different withdrawal clauses. First of all, the 
additional tariff preferences may be withdrawn if the country in question no 
longer incorporates or effectively implements the international conventions 
mentioned above.167 Secondly, also the preferences under the general ar-
rangement and the special arrangement for the least developed countries may 
be withdrawn.168 This chapter will mainly refer to the latter withdrawal clause; 
the procedure is, however, the same for all arrangements. 
The general withdrawal clause applies regardless of whether a country had 
ratified the relevant conventions or not. It comprises only the human rights 
conventions listed in Annex III of the Regulation. The application of the with-
drawal clause is furthermore limited to violations of the “principles” of the 
conventions. It would therefore appear that only acts infringing a main provi-
sion in a convention can lead to a withdrawal, while the contravention of mar-
ginal provisions is not taken into account, a distinction which is, however, not 
always easy to draw. 
Moreover, only “serious and systematic violations” may lead to a with-
drawal of the preferences under the general arrangement. While the term “seri-
ous” implies a certain gravity of the infringement, the term “systematic“ re-
quires that the infringements are not caused by a coincidence, but are the prod-
uct of a institutionalised action or omission of the state. It seems to be clear 
that a normal infringement of a provision of the relevant conventions is not 
sufficient for the withdrawal. The precise threshold for such a violation must 
be determined for each convention independently leaving considerable room 
for interpretation. 
Similarly to the Human Rights and Good Governance Clause under GSP+, 
the general withdrawal clause has evolved significantly over the years. Intro-
duced in 1994, its scope was fairly limited, comprised only the conventions on 
forced labour169 which has been criticised as an unjustified “hierarchisation” of 
core labour standard, which was at odds with the ILO policy in this regard.170 
                                                 
167  Article 15 (2) of Regulation 732/2008. 
168  Article 15 (1) of Regulation 732/2008. 
169  See Article 9 (1) of Regulation 3281/94. 
170  This distinction has been criticised because it seemed to suggest that the exploitation 
of children and the assassination of trade unionists through death squads is less seri-
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This problem was solved in 2001 when the remaining six conventions on core 
labour standards were added to the general withdrawal clause.171 In 2005, the 
scope of the withdrawal clause was further extended to the nine human rights 
conventions mentioned above.172 This enlargement implies that the chances of 
a country to have its general preferences revoked because of the application of 
the withdrawal clause increases considerably. Just as in the case of the Human 
Rights and Good Governance Clause, it remains to be seen whether the Com-
mission will react to the increased “burden” of the beneficiary countries by 
interpreting the open terms of the withdrawal clause in a more restrictive man-
ner than before.173 
b) The withdrawal procedure 
i) The investigation procedure 
The investigation procedure consists of two main parts, namely a consultation 
phase and the examination phase.174 The procedure may be triggered either by 
the Commission or a Member State.175 If either receives information “that may 
justify” temporary withdrawal of the general preferences, and constitute “suffi-
cient ground for an investigation”, they shall call for confidential consulta-
tions. These consultations should take place within one month. After the con-
sultations, the Commission may decide, within one month and in consultation 
with the GSP-Committee, whether or not to commence an investigation. 176 
The examination phase in the strict sense of the term begins with the Commis-
                                                                                                                                                     
ous human rights violations than forced labour camps, see Tsogas, G., Labour Stan-
dards in the Generalized System of Preferences of the European Union and the 
United States, European Journal of Industrial Relations 2000, pp. 351-370 at 363. 
171  Article 26 (a) and (b) of Regulation 2501/2001. 
172  Article 16 (1) of Regulation 980/2005. 
173  See further Vandaele, A., International Labour Rights and the Social Clause: 
Friends or Foes, Cameron May (London) 2005, p. 286. 
174  For more information on the logic of the withdrawal procedure see Dispersyn, M., 
Régulation et dimension sociale dans le système des préférences généralisées (SPG) 
de l’Union Européenne, in: Mondialisation et régulation sociale: XXIIIiémes Jour-
nées de l’Association d’Economie Sociale, Paris et al 2003, pp. 449-458 at 455. 
175  Article 17 (1) of Regulation 732/2008. 
176  See Article 18 (2) in conjunction with Article 28 (5) VO and Article 3 and 7 of De-
cision 1999/468. According to these provisions, the Commission shall submit a pro-
posal to the GSP-Committee on which the latter may comment. The Commission is 
not bound by the comments of the GSP-Committee (see Article 3 (4) of Decision 
1999/468). 
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sion informing the beneficiary country concerned of the investigation, and 
publishing an announcement thereof in the Official Journal of the European 
Union. The notice would contain a summary of the relevant information on the 
case, inviting interested parties to send their observations to the Commission 
within a four-month period.177 The period of investigation should not exceed 
one year.178 The Commission may, however, extend the period after consulting 
the GSP-Committee. 
The Commission then examines the relevant information. Among other 
things, the Commission shall consider the available reports and findings of the 
competent international organisations. These documents shall constitute the 
point of departure of the investigation.179 The Commission may verify that in-
formation by consulting economic operators and the beneficiary country con-
cerned.180 The Regulation attaches thus considerable importance to the find-
ings of international organisations when determining whether there is a “sys-
tematic and serious” violation. The beneficiary country shall have “every op-
portunity to cooperate in the investigation”.181 However, if the country does 
not submit information within the period of four months, or if it impedes the 
investigation “significantly”, the Commission may limit itself to other avail-
able information.182 
Unfortunately, the European Parliament still does not have a role in the 
procedure, despite several requests to allow for its participation in the consul-
                                                 
177  Article 18 (1) of Regulation 732/2008. 
178  Article 18 (6) of Regulation 732/2008. 
179  Article 18 (3) of Regulation 732/2008. 
180  Although the term “economic operator” does not refer to NGOs, the Commission held 
also consultations with several representatives of civil society, see Proposal for a 
Council Regulation temporarily withdrawing access to the generalised tariff prefer-
ences from the Republic of Belarus, COM(2006) 764 final of 30 November 2006, 
para. 4 of the justification. See also European Parliament legislative resolution of 5 
June 2008, Amendment 26, according to which the Commission should have the ex-
plicit right to consult “representatives of civil society, (including the social partners)”. 
181  Article 18 (2) of Regulation 732/2008. 
182  Article 19 (5) of Regulation 732/2008. This has been the case in the investigation 
regarding Myanmar in 1996 where the country refused to cooperate with the Com-
mission and refused, in particular, to let an independent commission of inquiry enter 
the country, see 8th Recital of Council Regulation (EC) No 552/97 of 24 March 1997 
temporarily withdrawing access to generalized tariff preferences from the Union of 
Myanmar, OJ L 85, 27.3.1997, pp. 8–9 (hereafter: Regulation 552/97). 
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tations.183 
ii) The evaluation period and adoption of the withdrawal decision 
Once the investigation is completed the Commission shall report its findings to 
the GSP-Committee.184 At this stage, two options are open to the Commission. 
Where it has been established that temporary withdrawal is not justified, the 
Commission shall, after having consulted the GSP-Committee, terminate the 
investigation and publish the decision and the main reasons thereof in the Offi-
cial Journal.185 If the Commission comes to the conclusion that the situation 
within the country justifies withdrawal of the preferences, the Commission 
will, again in consultation with the GSP-Committee, monitor and evaluate the 
situation for a period of six months. The Commission will inform the country 
concerned of the decision. At the same time the Commission will publish a no-
tice in the Official Journal, announcing that it will propose to the Council to 
withdraw the preferences unless the country makes a commitment to make the 
situation conform to the Conventions referred to by the withdrawal clause “in a 
reasonable period of time”.186 
If the Commission deems the withdrawal necessary after the six months pe-
riod, it will submit a proposal to the Council. The latter shall decide on the 
proposal by a qualified majority.187 The decision shall be taken within a two 
month period, which is twice as long as the period provided for by the GSP 
Regulation from 2005.188 If the Council decides to temporarily withdraw the 
preferences, the decision enters into force six months after its adoption, unless 
the Council decides prior to this, that the reasons leading to this decision are no 
longer relevant.189 
The entry into force of the Council decision results directly in the tempo-
                                                 
183  See Amendments 35 and 37 of European Parliament legislative resolution of 9 
March 2005 and, most recently, European Parliament legislative resolution of 5 June 
2008, Amendments 24 and 26. 
184  Article 19 (1) of Regulation 732/2008. 
185  Article 19 (2) of Regulation 732/2008. 
186  Article 19 (3) of Regulation 732/2008. 
187  Article 19 (4) of Regulation 732/2008. 
188  See ibid. and Article 20 (4) of Regulation 980/2005. 
189  Article 19 (5) of Regulation 732/2008. According to the wording of this provision, 
the form in which the legal act is to be adopted is a decision. However, both in the 
Myanmar and the Belarus case the temporary withdrawal was given effect by a 
Regulation which may be explained by the political importance of these measures. 
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rary withdrawal of both the general preferences and any special preferences 
that have possibly been granted. As a consequence the general EC provisions 
on standards customs will become applicable to the country concerned. The 
withdrawal may affect either all or certain specific products exported by the 
country190 and will be revoked once the infringements of the relevant princi-
ples of the aforementioned conventions cease to apply.191 Similar to the deci-
sion on admission to GSP+, the developing countries concerned by a with-
drawal decision may bring legal action against that decision before the Court 
of First Instance (see above). 
iii) The margin of discretion of the Commission and the Council 
In the context of the withdrawal procedure, a special problem can be identified 
relating to the vast discretion of the Community institutions. Not only is the 
Commission granted a considerable margin of interpretation with regard to cer-
tain general terms like a “serious and systematic violation”, but it has also re-
ceived much latitude as for the ability to initiate an investigation procedure. 
Indeed, the Commission is at complete liberty to refrain from opening an in-
vestigation even if there is sufficient information documenting human rights 
violations, which could justify a withdrawal.192 
A similar problem exists regarding the final adoption of the withdrawal de-
cision. The Council decides upon the proposal of the Commission without hav-
ing to consider any factual or normative criterion. This implies that it may de-
cide not to withdraw the preferences even in the case of compelling evidence 
of the most flagrant violations of the relevant conventions.193 This latitude 
makes the entire application of the withdrawal clause subject to the political 
will of the Commission and the Council. It thereby severely obstructs both the 
efficiency and the legitimacy of the withdrawal clause and should be discarded 
                                                 
190  Article 15 (1) of Regulation 732/2008. 
191  See Article 2 of Council Regulation (EC) No 1933/2006 of 21 December 2006 tem-
porarily withdrawing access to the generalised tariff preferences from the Republic 
of Belarus, OJ L 405, 30.12.2006, pp. 35-40 (hereafter Regulation 1933/2006). 
192  The Commission has made use of its discretion, for example, in the case of Pakistan 
in 1997. Here, trade union federations lodged a complaint with the Commission be-
cause of the massive evidence of child labour in Pakistan, see further Brandtner, 
B./Rosas, A., Trade Preferences and Human Rights, In: Alston, Philip (ed.): The EU 
and Human Rights, Oxford University Press (Oxford) 1999, pp. 699-722. 
193  Similar criticism has been expressed by Novitz, op cit., p. 232 and Smith, K. E., The 
Use of Political Conditionality in the EU’s Relations with Third Countries. How ef-
fective?, (1997) EUI Working Paper SPS No. 97/7. 
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as soon as possible.194 
c) Application in practice 
i) Coherence with the findings of international organisations 
In the history of the withdrawal clause, starting from 1994, the preferences 
have been withdrawn only two times. The first case concerned Myanmar 
whose preferences where withdrawn in March 1997 on account of violations of 
the international forced labour conventions.195 The second, more recent case 
concerned Belarus, where trade union confederations196 filed a request with the 
Commission in 2003, alleging violations of freedom of association and the 
right to collective bargaining, and demanding that an investigation be initiated 
against the Belarusian government.197 The preferences of Belarus were with-
drawn in June 2007.198 
An aspect of particular importance is the coherence between the decision of 
the Community institutions and the findings of the relevant international or-
ganisations. Important insights in the application of the withdrawal clause can 
be obtained by analysing the recent Belarus case. During this investigation, the 
Commission scrutinised the situation in Belarus in the light of the international 
labour standards. It thereby took into consideration the relevant reports of the 
ILO Committee of Freedom of Association and of the ILO Committee of Ex-
perts which it considered as “main reference on interpretation of international 
                                                 
194  The European Parliament has already put forward a proposal to improve this prob-
lem. According to this proposal, the Commission shall open an investigation “in all 
cases in which the ILO Conference Committee on the Application of Standards has 
approved a ‘special Paragraph’ on labour practices in a beneficiary country with re-
gard to the core labour standards”; see European Parliament legislative resolution of 
5 June 2008, Amendment 25. This refers to cases where the aforementioned Com-
mittee has formally established that the situation in the country concerned is not in 
conformity with the relevant ILO Convention. Such an amendment would have the 
advantage that the discretion of the Commission would be restricted in coherence 
with the decisions of the ILO supervisory bodies. However, this would favour cer-
tain conventions over others as only ILO Conventions can be subject to such a spe-
cial procedure. 
195  Article 1 and 3 of Regulation 552/97. 
196  The acting trade union confederations were International Confederation of Free 
Trade Unions (ICFTU), the European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC) and the 
World Labour Confederation (WLC), see 2nd Recital of Regulation 1933/2006. 
197  This request was made under Article 27 of the preceding Regulation 2501/2001. 
198  See Article 1 of Regulation 1933/2006. 
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labour law and rules of correlation between national and international stan-
dards.”199 It also relied on the report of the ILO Commission of Inquiry.200 
This report found Belarus to be in breach of the ILO conventions on freedom 
of association and collective bargaining and set out 12 recommendations with 
which the Belarusian Government failed to comply within the prescribed pe-
riod of time.201 “Based on this information and its own review”, the Commis-
sion came to the conclusion that the temporary withdrawal of the preferences 
would be justified. During the monitoring and evaluation period, the Commis-
sion explicitly requested Belarus to conform to the twelve recommendations of 
the ILO Commission of Inquiry in order to prevent withdrawal of the general 
preferences202. It also considered the follow-up reports issued by the ILO 
Committee of Freedom of Association on the case.203 
This analysis shows that the Commission seeks to cooperate closely with 
the relevant ILO bodies during the withdrawal procedure. While the Commis-
sion did not refrain from carrying out its own investigation, and apparently did 
not feel directly bound by the findings of the ILO supervisory bodies,204 an 
increased self-commitment of the Commission to the views of the ILO bodies 
can be noticed. The level of cooperation seems to be considerably more inten-
sive than in the earlier Myanmar case of 1997 where the general trade prefer-
ences had been withdrawn before the Commission of Inquiry had started its 
investigations.205 This is quite striking considering that in the GSP+ admission 
                                                 
199  COM(2006) 764 final, p. 2. 
200  Report of the Commission of Inquiry appointed under article 26 of the Constitution 
of the International Labour Organization to examine the Observance by the Gov-
ernment of the Republic of Belarus of the Freedom of Association and Protection of 
the Right to Organise Convention, 1948 (No. 87) and the Right to Organise and Col-
lective Bargaining Convention, 1949 (No. 98), submitted: 2003. 
201  5th Recital of Regulation 1933/2006. 
202  In the case of Belarus the Commission called on the government to conform with the 
12 recommendations of the ILO Commission of Inquiry, see sole Article of Com-
mission Decision 2005/616/EC of 17 August 2005 on the monitoring and evaluation 
of the labour rights situation in Belarus for temporary withdrawal of trade prefer-
ences, OJ L 213, 18.8.2005, pp. 16-17 and 5th Recital of Regulation 1933/2006. 
203  8th Recital of Regulation 1933/2006. 
204  As Orbie and Tortell put it, “EU keeps its options open“, see Orbie, J./ Tortell, L., 
The EU and ILO Relationship: A Case Study of GSP Labour Standards Condition-
ality, Conference Paper presented at the Conference „The EU and the Social Dimen-
sion of Globalisation“, Lissabon, 2 and 3 March 2007 (unpublished draft on file with 
the author), p. 11. 
205  The regulation withdrawing the preferences of Myanmar, Regulation 552/97, was 
adopted 24 March 1997. However, the ILO Commission of Inquiry held its first ses-
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procedure the Commission does, as shown above, frequently not follow the 
international organisations findings. It appears that the Commission is much 
more anxious to ensure international acceptance for its withdrawal decisions 
than for its decisions on admission to the GSP+, which illustrates the differ-
ence in political importance between the two case studies. 
In spite of the Commission’s efforts to apply the withdrawal clause in line 
with the findings of the international organisations, certain problems remain. 
Although the Commission seeks to comply with the international organisa-
tions’ findings once it has started the investigation it does not seem to pay 
much attention to them concerning the question whether to start an investiga-
tion. This has some puzzling implications. Indeed, countries like the People’s 
Republic of China, Sudan or Iran have never been subject to any withdrawal 
examination by the Commission.206 In view of their egregious human rights 
record,207 it is incomprehensible that these countries continue to benefit from 
the general preferences.208 Some explanation for this may be seen in the fact 
that these countries have often not ratified the relevant conventions, which im-
pedes the relevant international organisations from examining the human rights 
situations in these countries.209 However, the explanatory force of this argu-
                                                                                                                                                     
sion only on 9 June1997; see Report of the Commission of Inquiry appointed under 
article 26 of the Constitution of the International Labour Organization to examine 
the Observance by the Government of the Republic of Belarus of the Freedom of 
Association and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention, 1948 (No. 87) and 
the Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention, 1949 (No. 98), submit-
ted: 2003, para. 10. Orbie and Tortell, p. 10 call this „a total lack of coordination“, 
see Orbie/Tortell, op cit., p. 10. 
206  Note, however, that North Korea does not benefit from the GSP although they, ar-
guably, fulfil its conditions. 
207  See for example the reports for 2008 by Amnesty International and Human Rights 
Watch, and the report for 2007 by the International Trade Union Confederation at 
<http://www.amnesty.org/en/library>, <http://www.hrw.org/world-report-2009>, and 
at <http://survey07.ituc-csi.org/getcontinent.php?IDContinent=0&IDLang=EN>. 
208  Dispersyn points to the risk of an imbalanced application of the withdrawal clause 
with respect to economically or politically important countries, such as China, see 
Dispersyn, Regulation 2003, op cit., p. 457. 
209  See Vandaele, op cit., p. 485. Only the ILO supervisory system provides for a lim-
ited review of the situation of countries which have not ratified the relevant conven-
tions. Social partners may bring complaints before the Committee of Freedom of 
Association regardless of whether ratification has taken place. This applies, how-
ever, only to two of the conventions referred to by the GSP Regulation, namely ILO 
Conventions No. 87 and 98; see Swepston, L., Human Rights Law and Freedom of 
Association. Development through ILO Supervision, International Labour Review 
1998, pp. 169-194 at 175. 
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ment is limited. There is an abundance of NGO reports, which should provide 
the Commission with sufficient information on the human rights situation in 
these countries in order to initiate an investigation. In this regard, it is worth 
underscoring the pivotal role of the European Parliament and representatives 
of civil society that may bring cases to the attention of the Commission or the 
Member States, and thus contribute to a higher degree of coherence in the ap-
plication of the withdrawal clause. 
ii) Length of procedure 
Another problem relates to the length of the withdrawal procedure. It is con-
spicuous that the total duration of the withdrawal procedure has been length-
ened from less than two years in the Myanmar case210 to almost four years and 
six month in the Belarus case.211 
There are various reasons for this discrepancy. First of all, Regulation 
552/97, which applied to the Myanmar case, did not provide for a six-months 
monitoring and evaluation procedure or for a final six months deadline before 
the entry into force of the withdrawal decision. In addition to this, the dead-
lines provided for by Regulation 980/2005, which applied to the Belarus case, 
have on several occasions not been respected. The investigation procedure in 
the case of Belarus took almost 20 months212 – almost twice as long as the in-
vestigation in the Myanmar case.213 Furthermore, after the six months monitor-
                                                 
210  The procedure began 7 June 1995 with the request of the ICFTU and the ETUC to 
initiate an investigation of the situation in Myanmar, see 3rd Recital of Regulation 
552/97. The procedure ended with the entry into force of the withdrawal decision on 
the 3 March1997, the seventh day after the adoption of the Regulation; see Article 3 
of Regulation 552/97. 
211  On 29 January 2003 the request for an investigation of the situation in Belarus was 
filed with the Commission. The withdrawal decision entered into force 21 June 
2007; see 2nd Recital and Article 3 VO 1933/2006. 
212  The notice on the initiation of the investigation was published on 14 February 2004; 
see Notice of initiation of an investigation of violation of freedom of association in 
Belarus in view of temporary withdrawal of benefits under the Scheme of General-
ised Tariff Preferences (GSP), Official Journal C 40, 14.02.2004, p. 4. 
213  In the Myanmar case the investigative procedure was initiated 16 January 1996 (see 
4th Recital of Regulation 552/97) and the publication of the draft decision on with-
drawal of industrial goods by the Commission, issued on 19 December 1996 (COM 
(1996) 711 final), which was at that time the next procedural step. See, Article 12 
(3) of Regulation 3281/1994 und Regulation 1256/1996 respectively. Some scholars 
have presumed that the Commission extended the investigation in order to wait until 
the expiry of the time limit that the ILO Commission of Inquiry had set for Belarus 
to comply with its 12 recommendations; see Orbie/Tortell, op cit., p. 11. 
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ing and evaluation period the Commission did not immediately submit the 
proposal regarding the withdrawal of the preferences to the Council, but chose 
to further observe the situation, which led to an additional delay of eight 
months.214 
While a longer examination period may be desirable for the purpose of 
promoting thoroughness of the examination process, the examination period in 
the Belarus was so lengthy that this in itself is arguably detrimental to the effi-
ciency of the human rights clause. Certainly, it may in theory be functional to 
grant developing countries a sufficient period of time to remedy the violations 
of the relevant conventions. However, the withdrawal clause experiences col-
lated so far raise doubts about the benefit of such an extended length of the 
proceedings. In the Belarus case, the government tried repeatedly to hinder the 
withdrawal by putting forward very vague reports on the situation regarding 
freedom of association, refusing to show any intention to redress the problems 
identified by the Commission.215 In view of these experiences, a procedural 
timeframe of more than four years seems too long to ensure the efficiency of 
the withdrawal clause.216 
There are, however, several possibilities to streamline the procedure. First, 
the monitoring and evaluation period or the six month period before the entry 
into force of the withdrawal decision could be reduced. In any event, the 
Commission should be obliged to submit the withdrawal proposal to the Coun-
cil immediately after the monitoring and evaluation period has elapsed, so as to 
preclude further delays by the Commission. Regarding the investigative proce-
dure, the Commission could be obliged to give reasons for any extension of the 
one-year period in the Official Journal of the Community. This would allow 
for a review of the reasons of the Commission leading to an extension, which 
would arguably reduce the risk of politically motivated delays. 
                                                 
214  See COM(2006)764, p. 2. 
215  On the very day of the expiry of the monitoring and evaluation period the Belarus-
sian Government submitted a report to the Commission. However, this report only 
dealt with the general situation in terms of freedom of association in Belarus. It can 
be presumed that this report is partly responsible for the delay of the procedure. See 
in this regard 7th, 9th und 10th Recital of Regulation 1933/2006. 
216  This view is also defended by Hepple, op cit., p. 104. 
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2. Does the human rights withdrawal clause comply with WTO-law? 
a) Content and scope of the withdrawal clause 
The lawfulness of such an arrangement is slightly more unclear than the legal-
ity of GSP+, as the Appellate Body has, up to now, not dealt with a withdrawal 
clause in the context of a GSP. However, some conclusions may be drawn by 
applying the principles established by the Appellate Body in the affair EC-GSP 
to this scenario. 
Doubts have been expressed concerning the legality of a withdrawal clause 
under the Enabling Clause.217 These objections mainly rely on the wording of 
Article 3 (a) of the Enabling Clause, requiring a “positive” response to devel-
oping needs,218 asserting that the withdrawal clause could hypothetically de-
prive such countries of development assistance.219 It seems, however, that the 
Appellate Body considers it to be necessary that a preferential treatment based 
on development criteria provide for the possibility of removing a country from 
the system if it no longer conforms to its requirements. This reasoning can, ar-
guably, also be applied to the withdrawal clause. Most of the scholars, there-
fore, consider a withdrawal clause to be generally compatible with the Ena-
bling Clause.220 
However, similar problems arise under the Human Rights and Good Gov-
ernance Clause. Although the withdrawal clause does not refer the ratification 
and implementation of international conventions, it does require countries to 
respect human rights standards that are set out in these legal instruments. The 
question as to the legality of the withdrawal clause would therefore be subject 
to the same arguments that apply to the Human Rights and Good Governance 
Clause in the context of GSP+ (see above). 
                                                 
217  See Bartels, L., The Appellate Body Report in European Communities-Conditions 
for the Granting of Tariff Preferences to Developing Countries and its Implications 
for Conditionality in GSP Programmes, in: Cottier, T./Pauwely, J./Bonanomi, E. 
Bürgi (eds.): Human Rights and International Trade, OUP (Oxford) 2005, pp. 463-
485 at 484; Bartels, in: Charnovitz et al, op cit., p. 245, Clapham/Martignoni, op cit., 
p. 289. This question had been left open by the Appellate Body; see WTO Appellate 
Body Report EC – Tariff Preferences, para. 129. 
218  See also WTO Appellate Body Report EC-Tariff Preferences, para. 164. 
219  See Bartels, Appellate Body Dispute 2005, op cit., p. 484. 
220  See in this regard; Charnovitz, in: Charnovitz et al, op cit., p. 249; Mason, op cit., p. 
541 and Blüthner, A., Welthandel und Menschenrechte in der Arbeit, Peter Lang Eu-
ropäischer Verlag der Wissenschaften (Frankfurt/Main) 2004, p. 477. 
 46
b) Procedural aspects 
Problems regarding the compatibility of the withdrawal clause with the rele-
vant WTO-provisions are raised by the different kinds of discretion that the 
Commission and the Council exercise in the course of the withdrawal proce-
dure. As mentioned above, the differentiation between developing countries is 
only admissible if the trade preferences are made available to all developing 
countries sharing a development need determined according to an independent 
criterion.221 This implies that the withdrawal procedure of the withdrawal 
clause must be rigorous enough to ensure that the general preferences are 
withdrawn from all countries not complying with the relevant criteria. 
In this light, it seems doubtful that the manifold discretion of the Commis-
sion and the Council is admissible under the “Enabling Clause”. In order to 
ensure that the preferences of those countries that violate the relevant conven-
tions are actually withdrawn, it is necessary that an investigation is conducted 
in all cases where there is evidence of such violation. If the Commission may 
prevent the initiation of an investigation despite sufficient evidence, it may be-
come impossible to determine whether a country is in line with the relevant 
conventions or not. Thus this procedure allows that even countries in flagrant 
breach of the relevant conventions can continue to benefit from the general 
preferences. A similar problem exists with regard to the decision-making proc-
ess, taking place through the Council. These procedural provisions enable the 
Council to refrain from the withdrawal decision even though the competent 
international supervisory bodies, and the Commission, have established that 
the beneficiary country is in flagrant breach of the relevant conventions. The 
procedure of the withdrawal clause allows thus that those countries, which do 
not fulfil the criterion for differentiation between developing countries, still 
benefit from the tariff preferences granted by the GSP. This leads to a breach 
of the Enabling clause. 
c) The application of the withdrawal clause 
As far as the application of the withdrawal clause is concerned, similar prob-
lems arise as for the Human Rights and Good Governance Clause. The re-
quirement of the Enabling Clause that the same preferential treatment must be 
available to all countries sharing the development need referred to, implies that 
the trade preferences of all those countries which do not comply with the with-
drawal clause have to be withdrawn.222 Not withdrawing the preferences of a 
                                                 
221  WTO Appellate Body Report EC – Tariff Preferences, para. 165. 
222  WTO Appellate Body Report EC – Tariff Preferences, para. 165. 
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country that commits “serious and systematic” violations of the relevant con-
ventions generates a violation of the Enabling Clause. 
It is true that it is not clear what exactly constitutes a “serious and system-
atic” violation. However, the Community has considered the situation in Bela-
rus as sufficient to withdraw the country’s preferences. Hence, the Community 
would, arguably, have to withdraw at least the preferences of those countries 
that commit human rights violations to an equal or more severe degree than 
Belarus. Admittedly, it is difficult to establish a hierarchy between different 
human rights violations. However, it can be argued that the Commission would 
have to initiate proceedings against all those countries where there is evidence 
of grave human rights violations, in order to avoid further conflicts with the 
WTO supervisory bodies. 
V. Conclusion 
The above analysis has attempted to give an overview of the state of human 
rights conditionality in the current GSP regulation. While certain achievements 
and, indeed, improvements, have been made, some major shortcomings sub-
sist. The main problems concern substantive requirements of the clause less 
than a need to improve its procedural requirements and its practical applica-
tion. Remedying these problems is not only a matter of political consistency 
but in some cases also a necessary condition for preventing further difficulties 
with respect to WTO law. Streamlining the application of the clause is all the 
more important given the fact that developing countries may challenge its arbi-
trary application before the European judiciary. The following seven theses 
summarize the major problems and suggest ways to redress them: 
Concerning the special incentive arrangement: 
1. The application of the GSP+ by the European Commission has considerable 
shortcomings. As shown above, four of the countries which have been admit-
ted to the GSP+, i.e. Colombia, Guatemala, El Salvador and Georgia, do not 
fulfil the requirements of the relevant international conventions. The practice 
of the European Commission is inconsistent with that of competent interna-
tional supervisory bodies. Given the lack of other convincing reasons, the in-
clusion of these countries in the GSP+ can not be justified. Furthermore, the 
arbitrary application of the criteria of the Human Rights and Good Governance 
Clause amounts to a breach of the non-discrimination requirement of the WTO 
Enabling Clause. 
2. Due to the short examination period of less than two months, the large 
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number of conventions to be checked and the large number of requesting coun-
tries, it seems difficult, if not impossible, for the Commission to undertake a 
thorough analysis of the situation in each country. A longer examination pe-
riod is required in order to ensure the accuracy of the investigation. 
3. A number of political actors have criticized a lack of publicity and trans-
parency of the procedure. This could be improved by involving civil society 
and the European Parliament in the examination procedure and by obliging the 
Commission to motivate its decisions to admit developing countries to the 
GSP+. 
Concerning the withdrawal clause: 
4. The greatest objection to the withdrawal procedure lies in the high degree of 
discretion afforded to the institutions of the Community, enabling the Com-
mission and the Council to refrain from the withdrawal of preferences even 
when there is a flagrant breach of the conditions of the withdrawal clause. This 
threatens the credibility of the withdrawal clause as a whole and constitutes a 
breach of WTO-law. The discretionary elements of the withdrawal procedure 
should therefore be discarded as soon as possible. 
5. The human rights record of several countries benefiting from the GSP is 
equal to that of the countries whose preferences have been withdrawn for rea-
sons based on the human rights situation, and in some cases even worse. The 
credibility of the withdrawal clause can only be maintained if all countries that 
commit “serious and systematic violations” of the relevant international con-
ventions are excluded from the GSP. This is all the more important, since the 
half-hearted application of the conditions of the withdrawal clause could lead 
to a breach of WTO-law. 
6. The length of the withdrawal procedure is currently more than four years, 
i.e. more than the lifetime of a GSP regulation. This hampers the efficiency of 
the withdrawal clause. The swiftness of the procedure could be increased by 
abolishing the six-month period between the adoption of the withdrawal deci-
sion and its entry into force, and by limiting the Commission’s power to pro-
long the procedure. 
Beyond these concrete points, of course, other, more general questions may 
be raised. Does it really help the promotion of human rights if countries are 
rewarded for complying with the relevant international conventions? Would it 
not be more efficient to grant special preferences to countries that have prob-
lems implementing the international conventions but that take serious and rea-
sonable steps to improve the situation? Is the withdrawal of trade preferences 
really apt of making countries that commit atrocities in terms of human rights 
change their policy? Does their incentive effect outweigh their negative ef-
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fects, such as including the situation of the population and raising unemploy-
ment rates?223 Also the longstanding question whether tariff preferences actu-
ally have a positive influence on the countries’ economy, is far beyond 
doubt.224 And in the long run, the practical importance of the GSP will increas-
ingly diminish, as the tariff negotiations within the WTO progress.225 This 
shows that there is much to think of as regards human rights conditionality in 
the GSP. 
In any event, it is clear that human rights conditionality has a chance to 
bring about positive contributions for developing countries and their popula-
tions only if it is implemented in a credible manner. The aforesaid problems 
with the current GSP Regulation should therefore be addressed as soon as pos-
sible. The changes made with the adoption of the Regulation 732/2008 showed 
that the Council of Ministers may be prepared to improve aspects of the GSP 
regulation, if sufficient pressure is exercised upon it. It may be hoped that civil 
society and the European Parliament will continue to push for improvement of 
the GSP regulation, so that the remaining shortcomings can be removed as 
well. 
                                                 
223  In the case of Myanmar the economic sanctions imposed by the international commu-
nity, in particular by the United States, caused serious damage to the national econ-
omy. It has been reported that many women who had been employed by in the indust-
ries concerned by the sanctions had been laid-off and, subsequently, been driven into 
prostitution. At the same time there was no sign that the Burmese regime was affected 
by the sanction in any significant way; see Maupain, F., Is the ILO Effective in 
Upholding Workers’ Rights? Reflections on the Myanmar Experience, in: Alston, P. 
(ed.): Labour Rights as Human Rights, OUP (Oxford) 2005, pp. 85-142 at 114. 
224  The literature on this issue is abundant: A particularly critical stand is taken by Öz-
den, C./Reinhardt, E., The perversity of preferences: GSP and developing country 
trade policies, 1976-2000, Journal of Economic Development Economics 2005, pp. 
1-21; Schöppenthau, op cit., p. 44. Others are rather supportive of the GSP while ar-
guing for improvement of the regulation and the effective utilization of the system 
see Onguglo B.F., Developing countries and unilateral trade preferences in the new 
international trading system, in: Mendoza, M.R./Low, P./Kotschwar, B. (eds.): Tra-
de Rules in the Making: Challenges in Regional and Multilateral Negotiations, The 
Brookings Institution Press/ Organisation of American States, 1999. For discussion 
of the effects of social clauses in international trade see Dessing, M., The Social 
Clause and Sustainable Development, Sustainable Development and Trade Issues, 
International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development Research Paper No. 1 
2001, available at:  
<http://www.ictsd.org/pubs/ictsd_series/resource_papers/SCpaper.pdf> (last 
checked 5 March 2009). 
225  See Vincent, op cit., p. 702. 
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